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The role of rural off-farm employment in agricultural development among farm 








This study examines the widely held view that earnings from rural wage employment 
can help farm households overcome constraints on farm investments. It uses a panel 
dataset of 359 randomly selected farm households from three resettlement areas in 
Zimbabwe over the period 1996/97 to 1998/99. It finds no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that income from rural wage employment contributes towards increasing 
farm investment for the sampled households, and it attributes this to very low savings 
rates on rural wage employment income. Further, it finds that levels of farm 
investment increase with the amount of labor and land used in farm production in the 
previous year, and for households with male and/or older household heads. It also 
finds an inverse relation between farm investment and farm capital stocks – evidence 
that households that had higher levels of farm capital stocks were disinvesting in 
agriculture over the period studied. 
Keywords: rural off-farm wage employment; farm investment; agricultural 
development; sub-Saharan Africa; Zimbabwe 
JEL codes: O12; O18; J40; R20 
Cette étude examine l’idée largement soutenue que les gains issus des salaires en 
zone rurale peuvent aider les petits fermiers à surmonter les contraintes des 
investissements agricoles. Elle utilise un ensemble de données concernant 359 petits 
fermiers, choisis au hasard, dans trois zones de réimplantation au Zimbabwe, pour la 
période allant de 1996/97 à 1998/99. L’étude n’a trouvé aucune preuve capable de 
soutenir cette hypothèse que les salaires des zones rurales contribuent à augmenter 
l’investissement agricole pour cet échantillon de fermiers. Elle en justifie la cause par 
le taux d’épargne très faible sur les revenus issus des salaires en zone rurale. De plus, 
elle montre que les niveaux de l’investissement agricole augmentent par rapport à la 
quantité de main-d’œuvre et de terre utilisée pour la production agricole lors de 
l’année précédente, et pour les ménages où un homme et/ou des personnes plus âgées 
travaillent. L’étude révèle également une relation inverse entre l’investissement 
agricole et le capital agricole – preuve que les ménages dotés d’un niveau plus élevé 
en matière de capital agricole étaient en train de désinvestir dans l’agriculture au 
cours de la période étudiée.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades, it has become widely accepted in both academic and 
policy research that rural off-farm activities form a significant component of 
livelihoods in developing countries. Evidence from field surveys during the 1970s and 
1980s across many of these countries shows that self-employment in household based 
enterprises and wage employment in rural labor markets are both widespread (Chuta 
& Liedholm, 1990). Furthermore, a large share of households’ income comes from 
off-farm activities (Reardon, 1997; Bryceson & Jamal, 1997), and earnings from farm 
and off-farm activities are in fact positively correlated (Haggblade et al., 1989; Hazell 
et al., 1991). 
The positive relationship between off-farm and farm income, in particular, has 
attracted considerable attention from researchers in this area. It is used in a number of 
studies to argue in favor of the widely held view that rural off-farm income is 
important for agricultural development as it helps households overcome cash 
constraints on farm investment.
1 If accurate, this view would be important for 
agricultural development in low-income countries where there is widespread evidence 
of institutional failures in rural capital markets. It is not surprising, therefore, that it 
attracts considerable attention from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
development agencies when formulating policies to improve the agricultural potential 
of households in poor countries (Von Braun & Pandya-Lorch, 1991; Bernstein et al., 
1992; Ellis, 2000). However, other studies and policy views have argued that 
expansion of the rural off-farm sector may have adverse effects on the development of 
household agriculture (Lipton, 1980; Low, 1986; Ellis, 1998). For instance, until the 
early 1990s households that had resettled on formerly white-owned farms in 
Zimbabwe in the early 1980s were prevented by the government from participating in 
off-farm activities in order to oblige them to concentrate on agriculture (Kinsey, 
2002). 
Although rural off-farm income may help to raise a household’s farm investment, the 
above review suggests lack of consensus on the exact nature of the relationship 
between rural off-farm activities and the broader process of agricultural development 
(Lanjouw, 2001). In fact, Reardon et al. (1994) point out that studies in Africa have 
hardly, in any systematic way, explored for factors that influence the direction and 
nature of reinvestment of household income earned from the rural off-farm sector. 
Studies that examine the direction of influence in the positive relationship between 
farm and rural off-farm production observed in the literature on sectoral linkages in 
rural areas suggest that the expansion of off-farm production in the 1960s was due to 
productivity gains on the farms following the Green Revolution (Haggblade et al., 
                                                           
1 See Savadogo et al. (1994), Carter (1997), Barrett et al. (2001), and Lanjouw et al. (2001), for some 
insights, and Reardon et al., who point out that ‘Non-farm income can be an important source of cash 
income, which can potentially improve farm productivity if it is used to finance farm input purchase or 
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1989; Hazell & Haggblade, 1993), which implies that the development of the rural 
off-farm sector depends on the growth of the agricultural sector, rather than the 
reverse. 
It is against the above background that this study examines the effect of rural off-farm 
wage employment on households’ farm investment. The study defines rural wage 
employment as all activities, regardless of sectoral classification, that households 
engage in away from their own farms in exchange for wages (Barrett et al., 2001). It 
focuses on rural wage employment because this is considered the easiest way that 
poor households in low-income countries can diversify into the off-farm sector (Hill, 
1982; Barrett et al., 2000). Additionally, despite growing evidence that rural off-farm 
economic activities have become increasingly important in Africa and the rest of the 
developing world, there are hardly any studies that try to understand the rural labor 
market as a significant component of the rural off-farm sector (Rosenzweig, 1988; 
Jamal, 1995; Anderson-Schaffner, 1996; Reardon, 1997). Most of the studies that look 
at rural labor markets do so only to understand their role as sources of migration labor 
to urban areas (Lucas & Stark, 1985; Collier & Lal, 1986; Low, 1986; Rosenzweig, 
1988; Bhattacharya, 1998, 2002). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the standard 
agricultural household model, which includes unemployment in the household to 
explain labor allocation to farm production and rural wage employment, Section 3 
introduces a farm investment perspective to the household model and establishes 
conditions for rural wage employment to raise investment on household farms, 
Section 4 presents the empirical specification of the farm investment model, Section 5 
describes data collected from resettlement areas in Zimbabwe that are used in the 
analysis, Section 6 presents results from the analysis, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Rural wage employment and labor allocations 
This section uses the standard neoclassical agricultural household model to analyze a 
household’s labor allocation to farm production and rural wage employment (Low, 
1986; Friis-Hansen, 1995; Bardhan & Udry, 1999). The model assumes that 
households maximize utility by choosing optimal levels of consumption (c) and 
leisure (l) subject to a full-income constraint – the sum of income from farm 
production and the sale of factor endowments. As a deviation from this standard 
model, this study assumes that households face incomplete markets for factors of 
production,
2 that rural labor is homogenous, and that a household’s own labor can be 
perfectly substituted with that from the market.  
The household’s objective is to: 
 
 l c U , Max  ,           ( 1 )  
                                                           
2 Evidence from studies in developing countries shows that rural factor markets, where they exist, do 









c wL E E L F p wL c p    α , , , .       ( 2 )  
The household faces the labor constraint 
l L L E
M f L    ,          ( 3 )  
where 
M L
M  .           ( 4 )  
The household’s utility function ( ) ( U ) is increasing and concave in both 
consumption and leisure. On the left-hand side of (2)  c p  is the price of consumption 
goods (c) and 
h L  is the amount of labor hired by the households at a wage w. On the 
right-hand side of (2),  f p  is the price of farm output.  ) ( F  is the farm production 
function, which is increasing and concave in 
f h L L L   , 
K E and 
A E  – the amounts 
of labor used on the farm, and the household’s endowments for farm capital and land. 
α is a vector of the household’s plot characteristics.
 The household labor constraint 
(3) states that the household’s labor can be allocated to farm production (
f L ), or rural 
labor market (
M L ), or consumed as leisure (l). Constraint (4) defines imperfections in 
the rural labor market, that is, there is a maximum amount of labor (M ) that 
households can sell on the market.
3 The case when (4) is binding is more important in 
this study because evidence from most developing countries suggests high levels of 
rural unemployment. When (4) is binding there is excess labor in the households, 
which implies there is no need to employ outside labor (i.e.  0 
h L ). Therefore, the 
full income constraint becomes:  
  wM E E L F p c p
K A f
f c   α , , , .        ( 5 )  
Assuming that c, 
f L , 
A E , 
K E and  M are positive, the solution to the first-order 
Kuhn Tucker conditions for the household’s maximization problem given the 
presence of unemployment in the rural labor market will be 
  α , , , , , , ,
* * L K A
f c E E E M w p p l l   and    α , , , , , , ,
* * L K A
f c E E E M w p p c c  . By 
choosing optimal demand for leisure, a household implicitly chooses its labor supply, 
which is 
* * l E L
L   . The next step is to determine how households allocate labor 
between farm production and rural wage employment. 
This study assumes risk-free farm production, and uses the supply/demand framework 
to explain the allocation of labor. The farm production function exhibits diminishing 
marginal productivity, thus for a given wage the household’s labor demand schedule 
will have a kink where the wage is equal to the marginal revenue product of labor. 
Diminishing marginal returns to labor also imply that the first hours of work go to 
farm production, especially given the very low wages in rural areas in developing 
                                                           
3 To simplify the analysis the study assumes M is exogenous. AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                                                                                              Cornilius Chikwama  
5 
 
countries. Once the opportunity cost of working on the farm is equal to the wage in 
the rural labor market, subsequent hours of labor are supplied to the rural labor 
market.
4 Whether the household’s labor allocation to farm production equals the 
optimal level (
f L* ) depends on the size of labor supply (
* L ) relative to the extent of 
unemployment in the rural labor market.  
Figure 1 shows the effect of employment rationing in the rural labor market on the 
household’s labor allocation.  
 
 
Figure 1: Allocation of household’s labor between farm production and wage 
employment 
 
If M is the maximum rural wage employment that a household gets, the labor demand 
schedule is 
M AD DD . Since (4) is binding, in Figure 1 the household’s labor supply 
(
* L ) exceeds the allocatively efficient level of farm employment plus the maximum 
level of employment in the rural labor market ( M L
f  * ). Thus there is unemployed 
labor in the households, which is equal to  ) ( *
* M L L
f   .
5 The unemployed labor, 
however, can contribute to the household’s income if used on the farm beyond the 
                                                           
4 Arayama (1985, 1986) and Nandkeolyar (1991) question this framework. They argue that for some 
agricultural households the marginal return to the first units of labor hours is higher in rural wage 
employment. They draw their evidence, however, from farm households in industrialized countries – 
Japan and the US, respectively. 
5 Other studies observe that wages in rural areas in developing countries do not fall despite high levels 
of unemployment. Minimum wage legislations, theories of efficiency and nutritional wages, imperfect 
information and resistance of workers to accepting low wages explain this phenomenon (Drèze & 
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allocatively efficient level. Savadogo et al. (1998) refer to this as de facto agricultural 
intensification. Whether all the unemployed labor contributes to farm production 
depends on the level of unemployment relative to the difference between the efficient 
level of farm employment 
f L* and the point where the marginal productivity of labor 
on the farm falls to zero 
f L0 . In fact, the magnitude of  ) ( *
* M L L
f    relative to 
f f L L * 0   can be used as a crude indicator of unemployment among agricultural 
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In a regime with low unemployment, all of the household’s unemployed labor is used 
productively on the farm through de facto agricultural intensification. This implies 
that  w FL   0 . Only a fraction of the household’s unemployed labor can work on the 
farm through de facto agricultural intensification in a regime with high 
unemployment, so there will be ‘idle labor’ among households that fall into a high 
unemployment regime –  0  L F . 
The above definitions of household-level unemployment assume that households are 
indifferent as to whether they take up rural wage employment or work on their own 
farms. However, evidence from other studies shows that household farmers prefer to 
work on their own farms rather than take up rural labor market jobs, partly to avoid 
risks associated with the food market (Weiss, 1997; Corsi & Findeis, 2000). The 
above definitions are therefore imprecise, as they overestimate unemployment in the 
households. They are used in this study only to demonstrate, theoretically, that the 
effect on farm investment of increasing the household’s rural wage employment 
depends on the level of unemployment in the households.  
 
3. The household’s farm investment perspective 
A policy commonly used to achieve demand-side expansions of rural labor markets is 
introducing public works programs in rural areas or expanding them where they 
already exist. To understand how such policies affect a household’s farm capital 
stocks, this section adds a simplified farm investment perspective to the household 
model. In particular, it defines the household’s capital stocks at any period  1  t as: 
 




t I E E  ,        ( 1 0 )  
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where   1 , 0    is the rate of depreciation of farm capital and  1  t I  is the amount of 
investment in the farm in period  1  t . This section assumes the amount of investment 
is equal to the household’s savings in period  1  t , so that, 
 
1 1    t t S I .           ( 1 1 )  
 
Further, it is assumed that the household’s savings in period  1  t  depend only on 
income earned in period t, that is,
6 
 






t t t M w E E M l E F S S        ) , , , ) ( (
*
1 1 α ,      ( 1 2 a )  
 
also expressed as 
 
) ( ) , , , ) ( (
* *






t t c M w E E M l E F S α .     (12b) 
 
Taking the total differential of (12a) and (12b) and rearranging gives  
 
  ) 1 (
*






1 ) 1 ( M M L t t c l F w M I        ,       (13b) 
 
which defines the effect of a demand-side expansion of the rural labor market on farm 
investment. To simplify the interpretation of (13a) and (13b), the study assumes that 
                                                           
6 Although this is a strong simplifying assumption, it reflects in many ways some fundamental aspects 
of households’ savings behavior in developing countries, in particular the somewhat myopic behavior. 
In Zimbabwe, this may be due to high rates of inflation, which have maintained negative real interest 
rates on savings. This, coupled with very high transaction costs because of institutional failures in rural 
financial markets, may explain why farm households do not make long-term savings. AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                                                                                              Cornilius Chikwama  
8 
 
leisure is a normal good so that 
*
M l  (the change in the household’s optimal leisure 
when  t M  changes) is positive. 
[) 1 (
*   M L t l F w ] is the household’s net marginal income gain from a demand-side 
expansion in the rural labor market. A marginal demand-side expansion in the rural 
labor market increases the household’s wage income by  t w , but also reduces farm 
income by  ) 1 (
*  M L l F . There are two components to the decline in the household’s 
farm income. First, other things being equal, a demand-side expansion in the rural 
labor market is matched by a decline in farm employment – the factor 1 in (13a) and 
(13b). Second, an increase in the household’s wage employment changes the demand 
for leisure and thus labor supply – the factor 
*
M l . Alternatively, the effect of a 
demand-side expansion in the rural labor market on farm production can be thought of 
as having a substitution effect and an income effect. The substitution effect is the 
commutation of the household’s farm employment with rural wage employment when 
jobs become available on the rural labor market. The income effect is the change in 
household farm employment when demand for leisure changes because of changes in 
the aggregate household income. 
The sign of  t t M I   1  depends on the unemployment regime the household falls into 
as follows:
7 
Regime 1: No unemployment –  L F w   
In the absence of unemployment, households choose the allocatively efficient level of 
employment on the farm, where
t L t F w  . From (13a) and (13b), this means that 
0 ) 1 (
*    M L l F w  since leisure is assumed to be a normal good. The study assumes 
that 1 0
*   M c  (the marginal propensity to consume income from the rural wage 
income lies between zero and one), thus it is clear from (13b) that a demand-side 
expansion of the rural labor market will have a negative effect on farm investment. 
Alternatively, the study can assume in (13a) that s (the marginal propensity to save) 
is positive. In this case, a demand-side expansion of the rural labor market also 
reduces farm investment. Therefore, when there is no unemployment in the 
households, a demand-side expansion in the rural labor market will lead to ‘de-
agrarianization’.
8 
Regime 2: Low unemployment –  w FL   0  
In a regime with low unemployment, the marginal productivity of labor on a farm lies 
between zero and the wage in the rural labor market. The impact of a demand-side 
expansion in the rural labor market on farm investment in this regime is ambiguous 
because the net marginal income gain component ( ) 1 (
*   M L l F w ) can be positive or 
                                                           
7 See the definitions of unemployment in Section 2. 
8 This could also provide some micro foundations of the process of structural transformation as an 
economy grows. The early work by Clark (1940) and Kuznets (1966) argues that growth in the 
economy, a rise in incomes, results in a decline in the share of agriculture in both output and total 
employment. 
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negative depending on how close a household is to a regime with no unemployment 
or high unemployment. When a household is close to a high unemployment regime 
(when    L F w/ ), a demand-side expansion in the rural labor market is most likely 
to result in a positive net marginal income gain and thus has a positive effect on farm 
investment if 
* * ) 1 ( M M L c l F w    in (13b). On the other hand, when a household is 
close to a no unemployment regime (when  1 /  L F w ), a demand-side expansion in 
the rural labor market is most likely to result in a negative net marginal income gain. 
As in Regime 1, this leads to ‘de-agrarianization’. The same results can be derived for 
(13a) as long as the assumption that  0   s  is maintained. 
Regime 3: High unemployment –  L F w  ,  0  L F  
A regime with ‘high unemployment’ means that households have ‘idle labor’. The net 
marginal income gain is equal to the wage in the rural labor market, and from (13b) 
farm investment increases when 
*
M c w  . Alternatively, focusing on (13a), it is clear 
that 0 / 1     t t M I  when  0   s . In this regime, farm investment increases with the 
marginal propensity to save and the wage in the rural labor market. 
The derivation of (12a) assumes that income from farm production and income from 
rural wage employment are fungible (and therefore factors out the savings rate). 
However, a survey of the literature on the fungibility of the household’s incomes from 
different sources suggests otherwise (see Thaler, 1990). Ishikawa & Ueda (1984) 
argue that the household’s fully expected income, such as that from wage 
employment, is consumed at a much higher rate than the less certain farm income. 
The difference in savings rates for farm income and wage income suggests that (12a) 




1           t t M L F t w t t l F s w s M I        ( 1 4 )  
 
where  w s  is the savings rate on rural wage income and  F s  is the savings rate on farm 
income. Since wage income has a lower savings rate than farm income, the positive 
effect of a demand-side expansion of the rural labor market on farm investment is 
dampened. The extent to which this happens is an empirical question that this study 
addresses in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
4. Empirical specification 
The empirical specification of the farm investment model assumes households have 
no access to capital markets, and farm investment is financed entirely from the 
household’s savings. Additionally, it assumes that savings are a linear function of 
income and distinguishes between savings rate on rural wage income and farm 
















ti Y  is rural wage income ( ti tM w ) for household i in period t. The 
specification assumes that  ti α  represents observable and unobservable plot 










ti F i t Y s E E L F s I     φ Z , , , , 1 .       ( 1 6 )  
 
By taking the first-order linear approximation for the farm production function, the 


















i A i L F i F F E F E F L F F s φ Z                   




ti F ti F s φ       .          ( 1 9 )  
 
The coefficient  L F F s    1  ,  A F F s    2  ,  K F F s    3  ,  Z F F s    4   and  w s  5  . 
The parameter  i   represents all time-invariant unobserved household effects, and  ti   
is an idiosyncratic error term whose distribution follows that of time-variant 
unobserved household plot characteristics –  ti φ .  
                                                           






i E E L F F , ,  , where the ‘bars’ indicate mean values of inputs in the production 
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The marginal product of labor is equal to zero ( 0   L F ) when households fall into a 
high unemployment regime. Therefore, when the savings rate on farm income ( F s ) is 
positive, the above empirical specification can detect whether households fall into a 









ti i t Y b Z b E b E b I           5 4 3 2 1       ( 2 0 )  
 
is observed. An alternative test for high unemployment will be to compare the 
distributions of  ti   and  ti  , where identical distributions suggest that households in a 
sample fall into a ‘high unemployment’ regime. 
Depending on whether  i   is correlated with the observed explanatory variables, the 
estimation of (17) can be carried out using Generalized Least Squares – Random 
Effects (GLS-RE) or fixed effects models. GLS-RE estimation treats  i   as a 
component of the error term and uses serial correlation in the composite error term 
( ti i    ) to obtain efficient estimates of parameters of the model. However, GLS-RE 
estimates will only be consistent if the set of observed explanatory variables is 
exogenous (i.e. if they are not correlated with  i  ). Where the observed explanatory 
variables are correlated with  i   consistent estimates can be obtained from fixed 
effects estimation since in the fixed effects model the explanatory variables are 
allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with  i  . 
By definition, the components of  i  are most likely to be correlated with the observed 
explanatory variables. For example, it is reasonable to expect that within the sample 
i L , 
A
i E  and 
K
i E are correlated amongst themselves and with the observed explanatory 
variables  ti L , 
A
ti E  and 
K
ti E . Thus, the estimation of (20) uses a fixed-effects model. In 
fact, the Hausman (1978) test for choosing between the GLS-RE and fixed effects 




The estimations of the farm investment model in this study use a three-year panel 
dataset of 359 households drawn from three resettlement areas in Zimbabwe.
11 Data 
                                                           
10 For example, for model (4) and (5) in Table 4 the Hausman chi-square statistics with nine degrees for 
choosing between the GLS-RE and fixed effects models are 55.66 and 45.29, which is evidence in 
favor of the fixed effects model. 
11 The resettlement areas are a result of Zimbabwe’s land-reform program soon after independence in 
1980. Starting in 1983, Dr Bill Kinsey collected data from a sample of 400 households that resettled on 
former white-owned commercial agricultural land. The 359 households analyzed in this study are those 
for which appropriate data is available. AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                                                                                              Cornilius Chikwama  
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are available for the periods 1983–1987 and 1992–1999. The analysis, however, only 
uses data collected for the 1996/97, 1997/98 and 1998/99 agricultural seasons. This is 
the period over which the rural off-farm sector became a more discernable feature of 
the resettlement areas’ economic landscape following the relaxation of laws that 
restricted resettlement households’ participation in off-farm sector activities until the 
early 1990s. 
The resettlement areas covered in the surveys are Mpfurudzi, Sengezi and Mutanda, 
located in three of the country’s five natural farming regions defined according to 
agricultural potential (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Selected characteristics of surveyed resettlement schemes 
  Mpfurudzi 
 
Sengezi Mutanda 
Province Mashonaland  West  Mashonaland East  Manicaland 
District Shamva  Wedza  Makoni 
Natural region  II  III  IV 
Average annual rainfall  750–1000mm  650–800 mm  450–650 mm 
Type of farming  Intensive crop and 
livestock farming 
Livestock farming with 
marginal cultivation of 
maize and tobacco 
Livestock farming and 
marginal cultivation of 
drought resistant crops 
Year established  1980  1981  1981 
No. of villages  18  8  29 
No. of households  563  289  575 
Sample households  230  100  70 
Area 345  km
2 84  km




The dependent variable, farm investment (INVESTMTt), is the net change in a 
household’s farm capital stock over the three agricultural seasons that are studied. 
During the 1995 round of surveys, households reported all their productive assets as 
well as their replacement values. In succeeding years, they only reported the purchase 
of new assets. Using the data, this study calculates the households’ farm capital stocks 
following guidelines set out in the OECD manual for measuring capital (OECD, 
2001). All the values are adjusted to 1999 prices using the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe gross domestic product (GDP) deflators for the years analyzed. The study 
calculates farm investment as the difference in net values of households’ farm capital 
stocks between successive years.
12 
Explanatory variables 
The factors of production in the household’s farm investment model are labor, capital 
and land. The amount of labor used in farm production is not observable from the 
surveys and thus a variable ‘the number of household members above the age of 15 
whose main economic activities are in the household’s agriculture’ (AGRIWKERSt-1) 
                                                           
12 Thus, farm investments in 1996/97 is the difference between the net values of farm capital stocks in 
the 1995/96 season and the 1996/97 season; in 1997/98 the difference between 1996/97 and 1997/98, 
and in 1998/99 the difference between 1997/98 and 1998/99. 
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is used as a proxy. The study uses value of farm productive assets and inputs held by 
the households (FARMCAPITALt-1) to measure capital endowments in the previous 
season. The total area sown by households in the previous season (CROPAREAt-1) 
measures the amount of land used in farm production as there is no evidence that 
resettlement households in the sample face land constraints in their farm production 
(Chikwama, 2004). 
Dummy variables for resettlement areas are used as proxies for household observable 
plot characteristics. The dummy variables included in the estimations are Mpfurudzi 
and Sengezi. Mutanda, the least suited for crop production, acts as a control region. It 
must be emphasized at this point that the dummy variables for the resettlement areas 
may also capture other settlement level characteristics that affect farm investment, 
such as local market prices and transport networks. 
The total amount of cash receipts from rural wage employment earned in the previous 
season (WAGEINCOMEt) measures a resettlement household’s rural wage income. 
The study ignores payments made to a household in kind from the definition of rural 
wage income since there is insufficient data to ascertain their values. Over the period 
that is studied, only about 40% of the households had at least one member engaged in 
rural wage employment. Although wage employment was varied, the majority 
(82.6%) of households in the sample had members working as agricultural laborers on 
farms run by other households or on nearby large-scale commercial farms. The 
proportions of households that had members in skilled manual employment or artisan 
jobs were very small – 4.7% and 0.5%, respectively. 
The predominantly agricultural nature of rural wage employment among households 
in the resettlement areas suggests that wages were very low. Over the three years, 
average household cash income from rural wage employment was Z$756, which 
represented 4.1% of a household’s total income. Further analysis shows that the rural 
wage income was much higher in Sengezi where it was Z$1,193 and represented 
14.9% of a household’s total income. In Mpfurudzi it was Z$575 and in Mutanda it 
was Z$720 – 2.6% and 5.9% of a household’s total income, respectively. The 
variation in the share of rural wage income across the resettlement areas reflects the 
relatively limited agricultural potential in Sengezi, which compels households to rely 
more on paid work. 
Variables included to capture the effects of a household’s socioeconomic 
characteristics on farm investment are age (HHAGEt) and gender (HHMALEt) of 
household heads, total value of the household’s livestock wealth (LVSTVALUEt), 
size of the household’s cattle herds (CATTHERDt), a dummy variable for access to 
loans for farm production (FARMLOANt), and season dummy variables (YEAR1999) 
and (YEAR1998).  AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                                                                                              Cornilius Chikwama  
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Table 2 and Table 3 present definitions of variables used in the estimations and their 
summary statistics.  
 
Table 2: Variable definitions 
Variable Variable  definition 
INVESTMENTt  Net change in value (Z$) of household farm productive assets at 1999 prices 
CROPAREAt-1  Total amount of land cultivated by household in previous agricultural season (in 
acres) 
FARMCAPITALt-1  Net value (Z$) of household farm productive assets in the previous agricultural 
season at 1999 prices 
AGRIWKERSt-1  Number of household members above age of 15 whose main economic 
activities are in household’s agriculture in previous agricultural season 
WAGEINCOMEt-1  Total cash (Z$) earned by household from working in rural labor market in 
previous agricultural season at 1999 prices 
LVSTVALUEt  Value of household’s livestock wealth at 1999 prices in current season 
CATTHERDt  Size of household’s cattle herd in current season 
HHAGEt  Age of household head in current season 
HHSIZEt  Size of household in current season 
INPUTSTOCKt  Value of input stock from previous seasons  
HHMALEt  Dummy: equal to one if household is headed by a male in current season 
FARMLOANt  Dummy: equal to one if household received a loan for farm production in 
current season 
MPFURUDZI  Dummy: equal to one if household is located in Mpfurudzi resettlement scheme 
SENGEZI  Dummy: equal to one if household is located in Sengezi resettlement scheme 
YEAR1999  Dummy: equal to one for observations in year ending 1999 
YEAR1998  Dummy: equal to one for observations in year ending 1998 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for variables used in estimations 
  Variable means 
  1996/97 1997/98 1998/99  1996/97  –  1998/99 
  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev. 
INVESTMENTt* 4.40    4.91  -4.97  5.93  -0.34 4.53  -0.30   6.42 
CROPAREAt-1 8.29    3.48  8.43  3.31  8.05 3.68  8.26   3.49 
FARMCAPITALt-1* 18.33    17.26  22.72  19.22 17.75 15.86  19.60   17.63 
AGRIWKERSt-1 4.53    2.59  3.52  1.53  4.04 2.51  4.03   2.30 
WAGEINCOMEt-1* 0.14    0.74  1.36  8.74  0.62 3.16  0.68   5.39 
LVSTVALUEt* 42.51    43.67  44.97  46.10  38.70 36.74  42.06   42.39 
CATTHERDt 10.49    9.54  10.35  9.75  10.88 9.91  10.57   9.72 
HHAGEt 55.22    12.73  56.44  12.46  56.72 12.81  56.13   12.68 
HHSIZEt 13.14    6.22  14.70  6.96  15.27 7.18  14.37   6.85 
INPUTSTOCKt* 0.79    1.50  0.49  9.08  0.46 1.09  0.58   1.20 
HHMALEt -    -    -    -   AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                                                                                              Cornilius Chikwama  
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FARMLOANt -    -    -    -   
MPFURUDZI -    -    -    -   
SENGEZI -    -    -    -   
YEAR1999 -    -    -    -   
YEAR1998 -    -    -    -   
Note: * Amount in Z$1000 at 1999 prices 
 
6. Estimation results and discussion 
Table 4 presents estimation results for the farm investment model. The estimation 
uses pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and fixed-effects methods. The pooled 
OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent if unobserved effects ( i   in model (17) 
in Section 4) are correlated with the explanatory variables.
  However, because the 
fixed-effects method excludes all time-invariant variables, the pooled OLS estimates 
are important for understanding the effects of time-invariant variables on farm 
investment. (The t-statistics for each of the coefficients are reported in parenthesis and 
use the heteroskedasticity-robust-variance estimator.) 
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R-Squared 0.3688  0.6388  0.3922 0.6558 0.3924 0.6567 
N    1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 
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The coefficient estimates for rural wage income (WAGEINCOMEt-1) are statistically 
not different from zero in any of the models. This suggests rural wage earnings have 
no effect on farm investment in the resettlement areas. From Section 4, this implies 
that the savings rate on the rural wage income is zero. Other studies note that when 
income from a particular source is very small relative to total income, it appears as 
‘current income’ in a household’s ‘mental accounting’ and thus it goes to finance 
consumption (Thaler, 1990). This may explain why rural wage employment fails to 
improve farm investments in this study. It is also possible that rural wage earnings 
among the resettlement households are not significantly different from zero and thus 
have no significant effects on farm investment. However, regarding the latter, further 
analysis shows that the contribution of rural wage employment to households’ total 
income is statistically different from zero.
13  
Table 5 presents uses of rural wage income among households in the sample. It shows 
that such income goes largely to financing consumption purchases. Between the 
1996/97 and 1998/99 seasons, only a very small proportion of households (2.5%) 
either saved or spent their rural wage employment earnings on investment related 
expenditures. The results are consistent with the literature on savings rates on incomes 
similar to those earned from rural wage employment – they are very low (Thaler, 
1990).  
 









Uses      
Food  purchases  64.2 69.0 57.5 63.4 
General purchases for household  47.7  51.9  49.3  49.5 
Invested in a business  0.7  .08  0  0.5 
Expenditures for children  0  0  0  0 
Saved 4.6  0.8  0  1.9 
Purchased  livestock  0.7 0 0  0.2 
Purchased  other  assets  4.6 3.9 3.4 4.0 
Other 10.1  11.9  8.2  10.1 
 
The coefficient estimates on the variable CROPAREAt-1 are positive and significant. 
This suggests that households that sow large areas in the current season will invest 
more on the farm in the next season. From the specification of the farm investment 
model, this implies that the savings rate on farm income ( F s ) and the marginal 
productivity of land in farm production ( A F) are both positive.  
AGRIWKERSt-1 is positive and significant in the pooled OLS model, but only when 
variables for households’ socioeconomic characteristics are omitted from the 
estimations. In the fixed-effects results, AGRIWKERSt-1 has no effect on farm 
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investment. Given that the savings rate on farm income has already been established 
as positive, this implies that the marginal product of labor on the farm is equal to zero. 
From Section 4, this suggests there is high unemployment in the resettlement areas – 
one of the necessary conditions for rural wage employment to improve farm 
investment. However, rural wage income fails to raise investment on household farms 
since it is saved at very low rates. 
FARMCAPITALt-1 turns out to have negative and significant effects on farm 
investments in all the estimations. It would be counterintuitive to interpret this result 
as suggesting the use of capital on farms beyond the efficient level – until the 
marginal productivity is negative. The negative coefficient on farm capital could be a 
result of the actual rate of gross capital formation on farms being lower than the 5% 
rate of depreciation that this study applies on farm equipment. Therefore, although 
households that had previously had large farm capital stocks may have had higher 
levels of gross capital formation, this falls short of offsetting high levels of capital 
consumption on the farms. This means households were disinvesting on the farm and 
agriculture was declining in the resettlement areas. 
 
Table 6: Pooled and random-effects Tobit estimates for determinants of 
expenditure on farm equipment and inputs (in Z$1000) 
  Dependent variable: expenditure on farm equipment and farm implement 
purchases (Z$1,000) 
  Farm equipment  Farm inputs 



























































































































2 R   .0227  .1328  
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Table 6 presents estimation results from examining the effects of FARMCAPITALt-1 
on components of farm investment – expenditure on farm equipment and expenditure 
on farm inputs. Since a significant share of households in the sample had no 
expenditure on farm equipment or inputs, the models for this expenditure can only be 
linear for a narrow range of the explanatory variables. Thus, Tobit methods are used 
to estimate these models. An additional variable, ‘the value of inputs held as stocks 
from the previous season’ (INPUTSTOCKt), is included in the estimations to control 
for a household’s inputs remaining from the previous season. The results show that 
FARMCAPITALt-1  has positive and significant effects on components of gross 
investment. This supports the earlier argument that if households had relatively larger 
capital stocks in the previous season, they would in turn have relatively higher levels 
of gross capital formation in the next season. However, the high levels of gross capital 
formation fail to compensate for the corresponding high levels of capital consumption 
and thus in Table 4 negative coefficients are observed on FARMCAPITALt-1.
14  
Judging by the households’ socioeconomic variables in Table 5 (column 3 to column 
6), coefficients of HHMALEt are positive and significant in all estimations. The 
coefficients HHAGEt are positive, but only significant in the pooled OLS estimations 
(column 3 and column 5). The study notes, however, that age and gender of household 
head hardly change over the short period that is being analyzed here.
15 In the fixed-
effects estimations, these variables are highly collinear with unobserved household 
effects and thus the pooled OLS estimates are more informative about their effects on 
farm investments. The age of household heads, very often, is correlated with the age 
composition of the households. The households with older heads would normally 
have more adult members, and this has a positive effect on a household’s farm 
investment since it increases the demand for farm produce or the availability of 
resources to invest in the farm, or both. As for gender, male-headed households 
generally have better access to resources for financing farm investments than female-
headed ones – especially in patriarchal societies in rural Zimbabwe.  
Among proxy variables for household wealth, only CATTHERDt has positive and 
significant effects on a household’s farm investment (column 6). Although 
LVSTVALUEt has positive effects, it is not statistically significant. FARMLOANt 
has positive effects on farm investment but the coefficient is not statistically different 
from zero. 
Compared with 1996/97, households’ farm investments were significantly lower in 
the 1997/98 and 1998/99 seasons. In the 1996/97 farming season, Zimbabwe 
experienced a drought linked to the El Niño Southern Oscillation phenomenon that 
affected southern Africa. As a result, there was further rationing of cash resources to 
finance farm investment in successive seasons, especially given that the households 
                                                           
14 Evidence on resettlement households’ income distribution over the period analyzed also shows that 
farm income declined and became more equally distributed. This means the decline in farm income 
was greater among households that formerly earned more from farming – those that previously had 
larger capital stocks (Chikwama, 2004). 
15 The age and gender of the household heads only change when the head dies or moves away and 
someone else takes over the headship role. While such changes do occur, they are only isolated over a 
short period and do not induce significant unsystematic variations in these variables. Although ages of 
household heads change every year, this does not cause any unsystematic variation in the variable 
across time.  
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rely on farm income to finance future farm investments. During the 1998/99 farming 
season, farm investments could have recovered following a successful 1997/98 
season, but the macroeconomic environment in Zimbabwe started to deteriorate very 
rapidly.  
In the pooled OLS models, estimates of coefficients for the resettlement area dummy 
variables have the anticipated positive signs given the agro-climatic conditions 
described in Section 5. However, they are not significant once the estimations control 
for households’ socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study has examined the extent to which rural wage employment can help 
households in developing countries to overcome cash constraints on farm investment 
and thus contribute to agricultural development. Its analytical results show that the 
effects of rural wage employment on a household’s farm investment depend jointly on 
the ability of rural wage employment to increase a household’s savings and the 
availability of surplus labor in the household. The literature on households’ marginal 
propensities to save incomes from different sources suggests that income such as that 
from rural wage income is less likely to be saved; instead it goes to financing 
consumption expenditure (Ishikawa & Ueda, 1984; Thaler, 1990; Carriker et al., 
1993). Therefore, although rural wage employment raises households’ income it may 
fail to raise farm investment.  
When there is no surplus labor in a household, increased availability of rural wage 
employment leads to ‘de-agrarianization’. A demand-side expansion in the rural labor 
market would cause the wage to rise and thus a household would allocate more labor 
to wage employment, away from farm production. However, when there is surplus 
labor in the household, a demand-side expansion of the rural labor market draws on 
idle labor and farm investment increases whenever the savings rate on wage income is 
positive.  
Using households’ farm level data, the study examines whether the above conditions 
are met in resettlement areas in Zimbabwe. It finds high levels of unemployment in 
the resettlement areas, which suggests that households have surplus labor. However, 
there is no evidence that rural wage employment helps the farm households to 
overcome cash constraints on farm investment. This is because the savings rate on 
rural wage employment is not significantly different from zero. Unlike agricultural 
income that has a positive savings rate, rural wage income goes almost entirely 
towards financing consumption expenditure. This implies, therefore, that policies to 
encourage rural households in developing countries to diversify into rural wage 
employment would not address cash constraints on households’ farm investments. 
Rather, priority should be given to policies that improve institutional credit provision 
to rural households. 




Work presented in this paper is part of the author’s PhD thesis from Heriot-Watt 
University, Edinburgh, Scotland. The views presented in this paper are those of the 
author and not of the Scottish Government. 
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Abstract 
Malian farmers have been cultivating millet and sorghum for millennia, but they are 
slow to adopt and develop modern varieties because it is difficult to observe the 
difference in yields in their fields, given the challenging local growing conditions. 
Farmer participatory approaches are therefore recommended. This paper applies an 
instrumental variables method to survey data from Mali to evaluate the impacts of 
Diversity Field Fora, a type of farmer field school which aims to boost millet and 
sorghum yields by showing farmers how to manage diverse varieties. Impact 
indicators are expected and recalled millet and sorghum yields, the total number of 
unique attributes of millet and sorghum varieties stocked as seed, and the relative 
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deprivation of the household farm with respect to these indicators. The findings 
suggest the project has had results at one of two sites where it has been implemented 
with the same local leadership and more intensively over a longer time frame. 
Keywords:  farmer field school; sorghum; millet; landraces; participatory crop 
improvement; Mali 
Les fermiers maliens ont cultivé le millet et le sorgho pendant des millénaires, mais 
ils ne sont pas pressés d’utiliser et de développer des variétés modernes parce qu’il 
leur est difficile d’observer une différence dans leurs récoltes étant donné les 
conditions difficiles de l’agriculture locale. Par conséquent, des approches 
participatives des fermiers sont conseillées. Cet article applique une méthode de 
variables instrumentales aux données des enquêtes du Mali pour évaluer les impacts 
des Champs de Diversité, un type d’école pour fermiers spécialisée dans la culture 
visant à stimuler les récoltes de millet et de sorgho en apprenant aux fermiers la 
façon de gérer différentes variétés. Les indicateurs d’impact sont les récoltes de millet 
et de sorgho que les fermiers attendent et celles dont ils se souviennent, la somme 
totale des attributs uniques de variétés de millet et de sorgho stockées en tant que 
graines, et une privation relative pour les exploitations agricoles familiales par 
rapport à ces indicateurs. Les conclusions suggèrent que le projet a porté ses fruits 
dans un des deux sites, là où il fut mis en place sous la même direction locale et de 
manière plus intensive sur une période de temps plus longue.  
Mots-clés : école pour fermiers spécialisée dans la culture ; sorgho ; millet ; variétés 
traditionnelles ; amélioration des récoltes grâce à la participation ; Mali 
 
1. Introduction  
Malian farmers have accumulated knowledge of millet and sorghum management that 
spans millennia. Pearl millet and sorghum are known to have been domesticated in 
multiple locations scattered across the Sahel – then savanna and now the border of the 
Sahara (Harlan, 1992). Archaeological evidence suggests that economies based on 
cattle, goats, sorghum and pearl millet were established in this region between 5,000 
and 3,000 years ago (Smith, 1998).  
Sorghum and millet are still the major crops of Mali, grown by subsistence oriented 
producers in an agricultural sector that is almost entirely rainfed. National average 
yields for both crops are less than one ton per hectare (Touré et al., 2006). For the 
Malian agricultural sector in general, the most binding constraint is the infertility and 
unsuitable structure of the soil, which in turn impedes moisture retention in zones 
with limited rainfall. The first devastating drought in a series occurred from 1968 to 
1973. The 1982–1993 period was persistently dry and marked by another severe 
drought from 1982 to 1984. Although there was more rainfall during the 1994–2003 
decade, conditions remained far drier than they had been from 1930 to 1965 
(Anyamba & Tucker, 2005). 
Low yields are often attributed in part to low rates of adoption of improved seed. The 
most recent draft Agricultural Census reports that the proportion of the area under AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





cereals with improved seed does not exceed 10%. By contrast, 89% of the area is 
under industrial crops with improved seed (BCRA, 2006). Improved varieties of 
sorghum have been more widely adopted than improved varieties of millet (BCRA, 
2006).  
Low adoption rates have in turn been blamed on poor performance of the formal seed 
system. Despite an ongoing process of seed sector reform, liberalization of seed 
markets for sorghum and millet has not advanced as rapidly as liberalization of grain 
markets (Vitale & Bessler, 2006; Diakité et al., 2008). The formal seed sectors for 
sorghum and millet continue to be largely state run, with some participation by 
registered farmer cooperatives in multiplying seed. So far, commercialization of 
farmer-produced seed on more than a pilot scale has posed an insuperable challenge.  
Surpassing the performance of farmers’ own millet and sorghum landraces is not 
easy. International and national research centers accelerated breeding efforts from 
1973, but new cultivars in the dry savannas made little impact on yields (Sanders et 
al., 1996). Of the improved varieties that performed well on research stations during 
that period, few performed better than landraces on farms, for several reasons. To start 
with, the imported breeding material was unsuitable. Initially, an emphasis was placed 
on material that was successful in India but was not adapted to the high soil 
temperatures in the Sahel (Matlon, 1987). Local sorghum and millet varieties also 
have photoperiodicity, which enables plants to adjust the length of the growth cycle to 
synchronize with the length of the rainy season. Unfortunately, early selection 
programs, combined with the effects of drought, led to the gradual elimination of 
photoperiodism in favor of a range of varieties with short, fixed cycle lengths 
(Vaksmann et al., 1996).  
These shortcomings have since been overcome by international and national breeding 
programs (Weltzien et al., 2006), but challenges remain. Attaining more than 
marginal changes in yield is difficult without hybrids, but while promising materials 
are in the pipeline, none have yet been released for either sorghum or pearl millet. The 
tremendous variation in climate, soils and production systems means that the degree 
of plant stress is not only high but also extremely variable within and among fields in 
close proximity. It takes time for farmers to recognize whether or not a new variety 
has advantages, which is one argument for farmer participation in testing and 
evaluation. In addition, decreasing public funds have meant that no breeding is 
conducted for some agro-ecologies, including that of Douentza, where part of this 
survey was conducted.  
Thus there is no consensus about whether it is lack of effective demand or supply that 
constrains farmer use of certified sorghum and millet seed. Because the private sector 
has not taken responsibility for seed distribution, and the public sector has failed to 
supply improved seed in reasonable quantities, some researchers have also called for 
strengthening the informal seed system (De Vries & Toenniessen, 2001), but 
knowledge about how this may be done is only beginning to emerge. Diakité et al. 
(2005), Bazile (2006) and Weltzien et al. (2006) recommend greater involvement of 
farmer and community organizations in testing and evaluating improved varieties, 
coupled with decentralized seed production to reduce the time lag between variety 
development and adoption, and to reach more remote areas.  AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of one such participatory research 
effort. Diversity Field Fora, which bear some similarities to farmer field schools, have 
been launched in Mali on a pilot scale. Given the small scale and brief history of the 
Diversity Field Fora in Mali, and the statistical approach we use to address possible 
biases, this analysis focuses on measurable, short-term impacts. The findings shed 
light on the potential of the approach, but should not be understood as a 
comprehensive evaluation. The next section summarizes key features of the project 
and Diversity Field Fora, Section 3 describes the methodology used to evaluate 
impact, Section 4 interprets the findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Project description  
Background  
The project entitled ‘Empowering Sahelian farmers to leverage their crop diversity 
assets for enhanced livelihood strategies’
1 was funded by the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) from 2005, coordinated by Bioversity International 
(previously, the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, IPGRI) and 
implemented by a combination of local, national and international organizations. This 
second phase built on an earlier IFAD-financed project, conducted from 1999 to 2002 
in Mali and Zimbabwe, which focused on the development of participatory strategies 
for on-farm (in situ) conservation of millet, sorghum and other crops. In the interim, 
IFAD also funded some farmer field school activities in the village of Boumboro, 
which became the locus of the San/Tominian project site during the second phase.  
The goal of the second phase was to support the livelihood strategies of poor farmers 
in Mali by strengthening their capacity to manage their plant genetic resources. The 
findings of the earlier project demonstrated the importance of plant genetic resources 
in the livelihoods of Sahelian farmers. These farmers must be able to meet their staple 
food needs directly from their harvests in an exceedingly challenging growing 
environment – or migrate. Well-adapted, diverse local landraces supply them with a 
range of consumption attributes that are important for preparing local dishes and other 
end uses, and enable them to match their varieties to heterogeneous moisture and soil 
conditions and to smooth labor needs over the growing season. Genetic diversity also 
helps combat the risk of crop losses from biotic and abiotic stresses – the most 
pressing of which is the variability of rainfall and dry periods at critical points of plant 
growth.  
Diversity Field Fora 
In the first phase of the project, several activities were identified to support the 
management of crop genetic resources in farming communities. The most sustained 
and comprehensive of these was the notion of Diversity Field Fora (Champs de 
Diversité, or DFF), which built on the concept of farmer field schools.  
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Farmer field schools are an adult education method developed and widely promoted 
in Asia to teach integrated pest management practices to groups of farmers. While 
there is considerable variation in form and content, the basic approach involves 
teaching farmers how to solve problems, set priorities and conduct experimental 
research through facilitated, hands-on sessions in fields allocated by the farming 
community for study. Reviews of the evidence for the impacts of farmer field schools 
suggest that they have not translated into changes beyond local communities, that they 
tend to favor the more privileged farmers in those communities (Davis, 2006), and 
that they provide an unlikely basis for sustained, group activity (Tripp et al., 2005). 
Tripp et al. (2005:1718) express concern that the assessment of farmer field schools 
has been ‘insufficient’, and Van der Berg and Jiggins (2007) explain that the 
methodology for evaluating their impact is still under development, and is 
characterized by a tension between statistical rigor, which implies a narrow focus, and 
comprehensiveness, which leads to a diversity of impact indicators and definitions of 
impact.  
In this project, experiments in enhancing knowledge of crop genetic resources were 
designed and conducted by villagers, with technical support from the project staff, on 
land distributed for that purpose by villagers. Farmers studied both modern varieties 
and landraces. As defined in project documents, DFF encompass a combination of 
educational activities, action research and training. They aim to strengthen the 
capacity of farmers to understand, analyze and manage their own plant genetic 
resources, by creating a physical space that facilitates the exchange of ideas among 
farmers, extension agents and researchers and stimulates farmer experimentation.  
The choice of project sites was guided by two fundamental criteria of location: they 
had to be in the drier savannas and in an area served by an IFAD investment program. 
Other criteria for village selection included considerations of feasibility, such as road 
access to the villages, willingness of farmers and leaders to participate in the project, 
social cohesion and availability of plots for experimental purposes. These criteria 
generate an obvious, but unavoidable, placement bias that limits the extent to which 
findings from this study can be generalized.  
The two project sites studied here are separated by at least 400 km along a northeast 
transect on the main road from the capital city of Bamako into the Sahara. Each is 
located in a unique agro-climatic zone and cluster of ethno-linguistic groups. The 
village of Boumboro, Commune of Mandiakuy, Cercle
2 of Tominian, Region of 
Segou, is situated in a semi-arid, tropical climate with annual rainfall levels of 450 to 
600 mm, which places it in the Sahelo-Sudanian zone. Variation in vegetative cover is 
linked to variation in soils, and the landscape is a mosaic of cultivated woodland 
savanna, heavily populated by shea nut trees (karité). Bambara and Bobo are the 
major ethnic groups at this site. 
The village of Petaka, Commune of Petaka, Cercle of Douentza, Region of Mopti, is 
located in the Sahelian agro-climatic zone, which places it within the 200 and 400 mm 
isohyets. The zone is composed of a series of rocky plateaus and outcroppings, 
interspersed with sandy plains, forest cover, cultivated areas and pasture. Villages are 
                                                 
2 In Mali, a cercle is an administrative unit in a region, followed by the categories of commune and 
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located on both the rocky plateaus and the plains. The major ethnic groups in this 
region are Dogon, Peulh and Sonrhaï.  
Location is also related to the development of infrastructure and services, which 
generally declines with distance from Bamako. Boumboro is well served by a nexus 
of feeder roads linked to the city of San on the main tarmac road. This site is closest 
to Bamako and has a higher density of large weekly markets and other types of 
physical infrastructure. The closest town to Petaka is Douentza, which is 
commercially linked to a nexus of smaller-scale weekly markets that are dispersed in 
villages with more restricted physical infrastructure.  
  
3. Methods 
Evaluating impacts  
The economics literature about evaluating project impacts emphasizes the importance 
of establishing the appropriate counterfactual. As it is often described, the problem is 
essentially one of missing data: differences between those who participated in a 
program and those who did not are observable, but it is not possible to observe the 
status of project participants in the absence of the project. Consequently, differences 
due to the influence of the project are easily confused with pre-existing differences 
between participants and non-participants.  
The term ‘selection bias’ is often applied to the errors in estimation that result from 
this dilemma. Several types of selection bias occur. When participation is voluntary, 
factors that influence the likelihood of participation might also affect the outcome of 
participation. For example, farmers with more income, assets and access to 
information may be more likely to decide to participate in a project, and attain higher 
yields whether they participate or not. In other cases, projects or programs 
deliberately target certain individuals according to their characteristics, such as 
income. As noted in this case, projects or programs may also be placed in certain 
zones or sites because of agro-ecology or infrastructural characteristics.  
To reduce selection bias, economists have proposed a class of statistical approaches 
that are commonly referred to as treatment models. Ravallion (1994) categorizes 
methods for evaluating project impact in terms of five basic approaches. Each 
approach involves an attempt to construct a treatment and a control group in such a 
way that they differ only with respect to the program, mimicking an experimental 
situation. The treatment group represents participants. The control group represents 
the status of participants in the absence of the program, and is composed in such a 
way that it matches or represents the test group as closely as possible – with the 
exception that its members did not participate.  
Each of the five statistical techniques has advantages and disadvantages. With the 
randomized approach, individuals in each group are chosen at random. This technique 
eliminates statistical bias but is not always acceptable from a political or social 
standpoint. After selection, individuals may opt not to participate in ways that are 
non-random. The matching approach is employed to compose test and control groups AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





by estimating the propensity of individuals to participate based on their 
characteristics. Scores are sensitive to the model used to construct them, and while 
individuals may be well matched on observable characteristics, they may still differ in 
those that have not been recorded, or in unobservable characteristics. Bias caused by 
differences in unobservable characteristics can be addressed through the double-
difference approach, which compares treatment and control groups before and after 
the treatment. This technique eliminates the effects of unobservable characteristics by 
comparing net changes in variables between two time periods. Reflexive controls 
compare the same group before and after the program, but ignore changes induced by 
factors outside the project, which can lead to false attributions. The instrumental 
variable approach relies on econometric methods to separate the effects of project 
participation from those of other factors that influence impact. Identifying valid 
instrumental variables is the major challenge associated with this method. Valid 
instrumental variables are those that determine participation but only influence impact 
through participation. 
Only the matching and instrumental variables methods are feasible in the context of 
this study. An experiment could not be designed given that related project activities in 
Boumboro were already in the process of implementation, from 2002. The data on 
which the analysis is based were collected as a statistical baseline with a relatively 
small sample size and single-period survey because of cost constraints, which 
precluded either the reflexive or double difference approaches. While feasible, the 
matching approach is not well-suited to analyzing the impact of this project because 
specific socioeconomic groups were not targeted. In addition, the impact indicators 
we use, which are based on the management and use of crop genetic resources, are 
complex. Handa and Maluccio (2007) conclude that matching is more promising as an 
approach for evaluating easily measured outcomes, such as those related to child 
schooling and health, than it is for more complex outcomes, such as expenditures.  
Sample design 
The conceptual approach implies a sample design. The test and the control villages 
must be as similar as possible with respect to agro-ecology and overarching social, 
economic and institutional conditions. At each site, both test and control villages are 
located within the scope of an IFAD project. The same non-governmental 
organization (NGO) that is active in the test village of a site is also active in the 
control villages. Ethnic representation is also broadly similar.  
An additional feature of this project is that one means of addressing its goal was to 
introduce farmers to new cultivars (both landraces and improved varieties) and to 
facilitate their own experimental processes as well as their informal exchange of seed 
and seed-related information. Customarily, farmers at the project sites depend on their 
own harvests or other nearby farmers for their millet and sorghum seed (Sperling et 
al., 2006; Diakité et al., 2008). Seed transactions most often follow ties of kin and 
clan, and are shaped by social and cultural norms.  AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





An effective DFF would lead to dissemination of materials from the locus villages
3 to 
other villages where farmers have social ties. Of the two locus villages, Boumboro 
has the longer and more extensive history of project activities. Here, staff reported 
that surrounding villages have been influenced by the project through farmer visits to 
diversity fields cultivated by participants and farmer-to-farmer exchanges of 
information and seed. In their study of the effects of health programs designed to 
reduce intestinal worms in school children, Miguel & Kremer (2004) refer to such 
patterns as ‘treatment externalities’.  
To address these externalities, we included in the treatment group nearby villages 
from which farmers had been invited to observe DFF conducted by farmers in 
Boumboro. Farmers sampled from these villages were not considered to be 
participants, however. At the Douentza site, all farmers in the treatment group are 
from the village of Petaka because DFF activities were much more recent and had not 
yet involved other villages. 
In 2006, in the test villages of Boumboro and Petaka, where DFF had been 
established, all farmers who were active participants were interviewed. Farmers in 
other influenced villages near Boumboro were sampled. These and the DFF 
participants constitute the ‘treatment’ group. Non-participants in both Boumboro and 
influenced villages were also sampled at random; these constitute the ‘control’ group. 
Other than the census of participants, farmers were selected at random until we had a 
sample of 150 per site, roughly split between control and treatment groups. The 
control groups include at least three villages per site that had not been invited to 
demonstrations or field days.  
Characteristics of households, farms, seed management, market participation and 
social capital were collected during 2006, along with yield information by variety. 
Data on variety attributes and additional yield data were elicited in 2007, when 
household demographic information was also reconfirmed. Among those households 
remaining in the sample, there were only a few with significant changes in 
composition (births and deaths). 
Sample attrition, particularly at the San site, and missing responses on some variables, 
led to an operational sample size for this analysis of 131 farmers (62 treatment; 69 
control) at the San site and 149 (56 treatment; 93 control) at the Douentza site, for a 
total of 280 farmers. Unfortunately, the San sample originally included some farmers 
from temporary populations who seek permission from longer established groups to 
resettle in the area. However, we posit that the remaining sample is representative of 
the more permanent population.  
In order to simplify the text below, ‘San site’ or ‘San’ is used to refer to the clusters of 
test and control villages in the Cercles of San/Tominian and the ‘Douentza site’ or 
‘Douentza’ refers to the parallel clusters in the Cercle of Douentza.  
                                                 
3 The locus village is the village where the DFF were held.  Test villages include these and villages 
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Impact indicators  
Since the goal of the project is to strengthen the management of crop genetic 
resources, we defined impact indicators related to these resources (Table 1). Stronger 
management of sorghum and millet varieties is expected to enhance yields and 
contribute to more diverse crop genetic stocks held in farming communities. We use 
as indicators 1) expected yields of millet and sorghum in the presence and absence of 
drought, 2) two-year average yields based on farmer recall, and 3) the total count of 
the unique production and consumption attributes supplied by the millet and sorghum 
varieties held in stock at the time of the survey. In addition, we construct measures of 
relative deprivation based on these variables. An indicator of inequality, relative 
deprivation, compares the standing of participants relative to others.  
 
Table 1: Definition of impact indicators  
Indicator of impact  Definition 
Expected yields    =) ] 3 / ) )(( 1 ( ) 3 / ) (( [
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 c b a c b a i i
i
i            
Where i indexes variety grown, is the proportion of the crop area 
planted to the variety,  is the probability the variety is affected by 
drought, and a,b and c are the parameters of the triangular distribution 
(the minimum, maximum and mode) variety yields. The superscript 1 
refers to a drought year and 0 to a year without drought.  See Hardaker 
et al. (2004). 
Stock of attributes  Count of unique production and consumption attributes of all millet 
and sorghum varieties held in stock in 2006 
Relative 
deprivation of farm 
household j with 
respect to variable 
Y  
=AD(Yj) P(Yj) , where AD(Yj) is the mean of the variable Y for all 
farm households in the site with values higher than household j, and 
P(Yj) is the proportion represented  by those households. Y in this 
study = expected yield of millet and sorghum, and stock of attributes. 
See Stark & Taylor (1989) and application by Edmeades et al. (2008). 
 
The first two outcome variables are yield measurements. Expected yields are 
calculated from triangular distributions. The triangular distribution is often used as a 
subjective description of a population for which there is only limited sample data, and 
especially in cases where the relationship between variables is known but data is 
scarce. Elicited in terms of only three parameters (the minimum, maximum and 
mode), the triangular distribution is the simplest approximation to a normal 
distribution and has been widely applied in analysis of farmer decision making under 
risk (Hardaker et al., 2004). Yields are highly variable from year-to-year in this 
growing environment, and expected yields have the advantage that they include the 
history of the farmers’ experience with variety. Although these are subjective rather 
than objective measurements of yields (typically undertaken by weighing the harvest 
of the crop cut from subplots placed in the field), social scientists often argue that it is 
the perception of the farmer that drives his or her decisions and is thus the relevant 
point of reference. This project is focused heavily on farmers’ perceptions and 
knowledge systems. Furthermore, low heritability in this production environment also AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





means that a yield measurement taken in one field or point in time will provide 
limited information. The survey team also elicited yields that were based on farmers’ 
recall of 2006 and 2007 harvests, but these were not thought to be representative. 
Yields in Douentza, for example, were extremely low due to locust infestation in 
some villages. Nonetheless, we have also included these as outcome variables. 
Each farmer surveyed was asked, for each variety grown, the minimum, maximum 
and mode production from all plots under that variety, in years with and without 
drought. These were divided by plot area to obtain minimum, maximum and mode 
yields. To estimate the probability of drought stress, farmers were asked to report the 
number of years they had grown each variety and the number of years of drought 
stress during that period. The minimum, maximum and most frequent (mode) yields 
were then elicited for years with and without drought stress. Unconditional expected 
yields were calculated on the basis of the probabilities of each type of year and 
corresponding yield estimates. The average unconditional expected yield per farm 
was calculated by multiplying each variety’s unconditional expected yield by that 
variety’s proportion of total crop area (see equation in Table 1).  
The third outcome variable, the count of unique production and consumption 
attributes, is a rough indicator of the perceived ‘richness’ of traits and uses embedded 
in the seed stored on the farm at the time of the survey. Farmers were asked to list all 
millet and sorghum varieties in stock and, for each variety, to list production 
characteristics and consumption uses. From farmers’ responses, a common ‘spanning 
set’ of production traits and consumption uses was identified. For millet and then for 
sorghum, each was counted only once for all varieties stocked by each farm 
household. This indicator recognizes that subsistence oriented farmers manage a set of 
varieties to address a complex combination of needs and constraints and that, 
typically, no single variety meets all their needs (Bellon, 1996). Thus, researchers 
have hypothesized that farmers with multiple objectives, and particularly those who 
cannot easily achieve their objectives by trading in markets, will manage more diverse 
varieties.  
Other indicators are based on the concept of relative deprivation – a measure of 
inequality that has been applied in studies of migrant laborers (Stark & Taylor, 1989). 
Recently, this concept was applied in a study of hybrid banana adoption by Edmeades 
et al. (2008). An index was constructed for expected millet yields, expected sorghum 
yields, and the count of unique variety attributes. The index compares the status of 
each farm in the sample to all other farms at that project site, and is constructed by 
weighting the mean of all individuals with higher status by their sample proportion. 
The larger the number, the greater the relative deprivation of a farm with respect to 
the characteristic in question. 
Econometric model  
Instrumental variables regression can be used to explain variation in impact indicators 
among household farms while controlling for the effects of underlying observable and 
unobservable factors. Instrumental variables models are special cases of simultaneous 
regression models in which the causality of the relationship is recursive but the 
interrelationship among the error terms of the two equations is explicit. In this case, AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





participation affects outcome variables but outcome variables do not affect 
participation.  
The general form of the instrumental variables model is  
i i v y    2 2i 1 1i θ x θ x           ( 1 )  
i i i i y z      2 1 1β x           ( 2 )    
where the dependent variables include  y , which measures participation, which is an 
endogenous regressor, and z , which measures the impacts of participation. The 
vector  1 x represents a set of explanatory variables that influence both participation and 
impacts, and the vector  2 x  includes instrumental variables that explain participation 
only. The error terms of the equations, v and  , have means of zero but are 
correlated. 
In this analysis, participation is a dichotomous variable (1=participation, 0 else). 
Angrist (1999) has shown that in models with dummy endogenous variables and non-
negative outcome variables, if the focus of the analysis is to estimate the causal 
effects of treatment rather than the magnitude of structural parameters, a number of 
simple strategies, such as two-stage least squares, can be applied. Two-stage least 
squares produces consistent estimators of the ‘local average treatment effect’ that are 
less sensitive to assumptions about functional form than probit or logit (Angrist & 
Krueger, 2001:77). To improve the efficiency of estimation when heteroskedasticity is 
present, the generalized method of moments is recommended. Standard diagnostic 
statistics include tests of a) the endogeneity of the first-stage dependent variable, b) 
the relevance of the instruments, and c) model identification.  
Explanatory variables (x1) that are common to both the participation and impact 
equation represent components of the ‘asset pentagon’, as conceptualized in the 
project according to the basic livelihoods framework. Human capital is measured in 
terms of the ratio of economically active persons to the total number of persons in the 
farm.
4 The age limit for the numerator was arbitrarily set at 12 years of age 
(adulthood). The total value of livestock and material assets inventoried by the 
patriarch of the farm is the indicator of farm physical capital. Variables for human 
capital and farm physical capital were both highly correlated with total land area, 
suggesting that farm production is based on fairly fixed proportions of these three 
critical inputs (use of purchased inputs is negligible). Financial capital is represented 
by per capita cash income, calculated as the total annual expenditures for the farm 
divided by farm size. In this type of agricultural economy, where savings are in the 
form of land, livestock or other material assets, eliciting cash expenditure is thought 
to generate less bias than eliciting income. Enumerators asked the patriarch of the 
farm to report expenditures by category. The total number of unique associations to 
which any member of the farm belongs is used as an indicator of social capital.  
                                                 
4 All human capital variables were inter-correlated (age and education of the household head, number 
of adult women, number of adult men, number of household members with any education), and the 
active ratio was the least correlated with other explanatory variables.  AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





Other key explanatory factors are those related to treatment, site and orientation of 
production. The site variable represents major differences in agro-ecology, ethnicity 
and social structure, but also in market infrastructure. The treatment variable controls 
for indirect effects of the project in the locus villages and other test villages.
5 
Specialization of production in one target crop rather than another is expressed in the 
share of target crop area allocated to millet. Target crops include millet, sorghum and 
cowpea. The target crop area was summed over plots where these crops were the 
principal or sole crop. Very few plots were planted to cowpea as the principal or sole 
crop.  
The last variable related to orientation of production is the number of markets in 
which household members buy or sell millet or sorghum. Since these are not 
commercial farming operations, no certified seed is sold in markets, and other 
purchased inputs are rarely used, the count of markets has no direct relationship to 
expected yields. In a commercial farming system, a direct relationship between 
variety choice (a modern variety, for example) and market involvement might be 
expected. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that market involvement may relate to the 
desire of household members to procure and test new materials in DFF, either because 
they sell, or because they are food-deficit, i.e. they produce less than their food 
requirements, or because there are unobservable factors that cause a farmer to seek 
information, whether in village markets or in project activities.  
Instrumental variables (x2) are those that affect participation but have no effect on 
impacts other than through participation, and are uncorrelated with the error terms of 
the impacts equation. These variables are 1) whether or not the patriarch has a 
Koranic education (instead of, or in addition to, public school attendance), and 2) the 
binary variable ‘treatment’ which controls for the indirect effects of the project. The 
variable ‘Koranic education’ is not highly correlated with any of the outcome 
variables (correlation coefficient range from -.02 to 0.37).  
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 2, and means and standard deviations of 
explanatory variables are shown in Table 3. The null hypothesis that variable means 
are equal between test and control villages cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level of 
significance, although p-values are significant at the 0.10 level for total asset value 
and number of markets at the San site, and millet share and number of markets at the 
Douentza site. Additional comparisons of sample characteristics in the project 
baseline document
6 indicate few statistically significant differences with respect to 
human, farm physical, financial and social capital between the treatment and control 
groups, with important differences between sites.  
Differences in outcome variables by treatment and control group are pronounced at 
the San site for all outcome variables except average millet and sorghum yields in 
2005–06. At Douentza, statistically significant differences are apparent only for 
expected millet yields and relative deprivation with respect to millet yields. The 2005 
                                                 
5 Although it would have been preferable to estimate separate models for the direct and spillover effects 
of the DFF on farmers, it was not possible for the survey team to identify the individual farmers from 
other villages who had procured seed when visiting Boumboro. This would have required close 
monitoring over time by a member of the DFF, which must be built into the original research design.  
6 Available from the authors. AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





season was an outlier due to heavy locust infestation, and these farmers (primarily 
Dogon) are quintessential millet growers.  
 










1 =Douentza site 
Treatment  Experimental design  0=Control village 
1=Treatment village 
Active ratio  Human capital  Ratio of economically active persons (>12 years of 
age) to total number of persons in the production 
unit  
Asset value  Farm physical capital  Total value of livestock and material assets (FCFA) 
Millet share  Specialization in 
millet vs other target 
crops 
Proportion of total crop area planted to millet 
Per capita 
income 
Financial capital  Total expenditures per year in FCFA in production 
unit divided by total number of persons  
Association 
membership 
Social capital  Total number of associations in which a members 
of production unit participates 
Markets Market  participation  Number of markets in which members of 
production unit sell or purchase millet or sorghum 
Koranic 
education 
Instrument  Whether or not the patriarch of the production unit 
has a Koranic education, either instead of or in 
addition to a public school education 
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4. Findings  
Instrumental variables regression  
The findings of the first-stage regressions are presented in Table 4 for millet growers.
7 As 
expected, given the higher rates of participation at the San site and longer project involvement, 
location at the Douentza site reduces the chances that a farm household will include a DFF 
participant. Economically active human capital in the farm household bears no direct relationship 
to DFF participation. Farm households that are wealthier in terms of farm physical capital are 
more likely to participate. Greater specialization in millet than in sorghum increases the chances 
a farmer will participate in a DFF. This may be because millet was more widely grown at both 
sites, or because fewer improved millet varieties than sorghum varieties have been released at the 
sites – with the result that farmers are in search of new materials and means of improving their 
own. Social capital positively influences participation – these farm households have a propensity 
to engage in local associations. Similarly, participants sell or purchase the target crops in a larger 
number of markets than non-participants, other factors being held constant. The first-stage 
regression is the same regardless of the outcome variable, since DFF included both sorghum and 
millet related activities.  
 
Table 4:  First stage regression results, determinants of DFF participation 
 Coefficient
Standard 
error P  value
site -0.2126 0.0452 0.0000
active ratio  -0.0183 0.0918 0.8420
asset value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0870
millet share  0.2546 0.0909 0.0060
per capita cash income  0.0000 0.0000 0.1090
numassoc 0.1068 0.0242 0.0000
markets 0.0739 0.0177 0.0000
edukoran -0.0035 0.0060 0.5620
treatment 0.2701 0.0357 0.0000
constant -0.1664 0.1105 0.1330
  
Test 
statistic P  value 
F( 9,   255)    12.06 0.0000
Centered R2    0.30  
Uncentered R2    0.37  
Root MSE    0.25  
Shea partial R2 of excluded instruments   0.18  
F(2, 255) of excluded instruments  28.8 0.0000
Anderson canonical correlation coefficient 48.9 0.0000
                                                 
7 Probit and linear probability first-stage regressions are shown in the Appendix. They are similar with respect to 
statistically significant causal factors (site, total asset value, per capita cash income, markets). AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   






Second-stage regression results for each impact indicator are displayed in Table 5. Taking into 
account underlying observable and unobservable factors that predict participation in DFF, 
participation influences all the outcome variables with a high degree of statistical significance 
except average recalled sorghum yields.  
Location at the Douentza site offsets estimated yield impacts, but augments stock of attributes 
and further reduces relative deprivation. The pervasive harshness of this environment, combined 
with the social structure of the Dogon, is a strong leveler of inequality. The greater degree of 
self-reliance makes it important for farmers to stock the varieties with attributes that span both 
their consumption and production needs. 
While being wealthier enhances the likelihood of participation, it has a negative impact on yields 
per hectare once participation has been considered – perhaps because these factors are associated 
with a more extensive operation and crop area that are harder to manage as effectively. As 
expected, specialization in millet positively influences recalled millet yield, and negatively 
influences recalled sorghum yield and the total stock of attributes. Per capita cash income is 
statistically significant only in the recalled millet yield regression, and social capital is 
insignificant in explaining outcomes once DFF participation has been taken into account. Market 
participation is significant only in the expected millet yield and deprivation model. 
In all except the expected millet yield and attribute stock regressions, the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity was rejected and the regression was estimated with GMM (Generalized 
Method of Moments), so that robust standard errors are reported. The Hausman test led to 
rejection of the hypothesis that DFF participation is exogenous in all cases except the regressions 
for expected sorghum yields and the relative deprivation with respect to the stock of attributes. 
The Anderson canonical correlation statistic based on the first-stage regression is highly 
significant, supporting the relevance of the instruments. The values of the Sargan statistic (in the 
presence of homoskedasticity) or Hansen J statistic (in the presence of heteroskedasticity) results 
in failure to reject the null hypothesis for each of the outcome equations. Thus, the instruments in 
the first-stage regression are uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage regression. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis would have indicated either a misspecification of the second-
stage regression or an invalid instrument.  
Three caveats are important to remember in interpreting findings. The first is that while we assert 
that use of longer-term, subjective yields is more reliable than actual recent yields, it is evident 
that these variables measure primarily changes in perceptions. They are not highly correlated 
with average yields based on recall, which is to be expected given the year-to-year variability in 
rainfall conditions and the fact that 2005 was an outlier season at the Douentza site. In 
Boumboro, the project has been operational from 1999 – but not so in Petaka – where project 
impacts are not evident for either expected and recalled yields once other variables have been 
taken into account.  
In addition, it is important to recognize that unobservable factors may explain both the decision 
to participate and yield expectations, which would contribute to an upward bias in estimated 
coefficients. Finally, the wide variation in average yields among villages, combined with the fact AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





that most long-term participants live in Boumboro, means that the coefficient on DFF impact 
transmits a strong village-specific effect.
8 As recommended by Angrist, it is the significance of 
the coefficient (causality) rather than its magnitude that should be emphasized when interpreting 
the regression results.  
                                                 
8 The descriptive statistics shown in the Appendix suggest that while the only explanatory variable that differs 
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Figure 1 compares the cumulative density function (cdfs) of predicted values of expected millet 
yields. Predicted values account for selection bias by incorporating the effects of factors that 
explain why DFF participants participate. As compared to the mean values shown in the 
regression results, the cdfs portray project impacts over the full range of predicted values. The 
graphs support the hypothesis that conditions are less risky for farmers in treatment villages than 
in control villages. For every predicted value of expected millet yields, the probability that a 
farm household will harvest less is lower in treatment villages than in control villages. Expected 
millet yields in treatment villages dominate in the first-order stochastic sense: any farm 
household in a treatment village, whether neutral to or averse to risk, is better off.  
Similar comparisons were made for predicted values of relative deprivation with respect to 
expected yields. In this case, households are worse off with higher values, which imply greater 
relative deprivation. A cdf lying entirely to the left for test as compared to control villages 
suggests that the probability of being more deprived relative to other households is always less in 
test villages – an improvement in status. The cdfs of relative deprivation dominate stochastically 
in the first-order sense for expected millet yields in treatment villages of the San site (Figure 2), 
but not for expected sorghum yields; at the Douentza site, they dominate for sorghum yields in 
the treatment villages but not for expected millet yields. For both crops at both sites, from the 
perspective of farmers’ yield expectations, conditions are not always better in treatment villages 
than in control villages.  
Figures were not reported for all outcome variables because of space limitations. In the case of 
sorghum, while the cdfs for expected yields do not cross, they lie tangent to one another at some 
points. First-order stochastic dominance is also evident for the total count of attributes. For each 
predicted total count of attributes, the chances are smaller that a farm household in a treatment 
village will possess fewer attributes.  
 AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   





































Figure 1: Cumulative density function of predicted values of expected millet yields, in the 


































Figure 2:  Cumulative density function of predicted values of relative deprivation with 
respect to expected millet yields in the San siteAfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   






Despite continued progress in breeding improved sorghum and millet varieties, and 
the gradual process of seed sector reform, adoption rates are often considered to be 
relatively low in Mali – a nation whose rural population has depended on sorghum 
and millet for millennia. Some researchers have recommended more involvement of 
farmers themselves in evaluating and disseminating promising varieties. This paper 
has evaluated a pilot effort to involve farmers through Diversity Field Fora, which 
build on the concepts of farmer field schools. DFF aim to strengthen farmers’ capacity 
to manage diverse millet and sorghum varieties, thereby improving productivity.  
Regression results concur with previous assessments of farmer field schools in 
demonstrating that participants in DFF are more likely to possess more social and 
farm physical capital than non-participants. Participation has a positive impact on 
expected sorghum and millet yields, recalled millet yields and the stock of variety 
attributes, enhancing participants’ standing relative to other farmers at the project site 
with respect to these impact indicators. Farmers in treatment villages are better off in 
terms of expected yields and attribute stocks throughout the range of predicted values. 
A significantly higher probability of participation at the San site, combined with the 
regression and descriptive results, indicates that the impacts of DFF were principally 
observed at this site in the village of Boumboro, where local field staff have been 
continuously engaged for a much longer period of time. However, inequality with 
respect to millet and sorghum crop genetic resources appears to be greater at the San 
site than at Douentza.  
Two policy points with respect to DFF emerge from these findings. First, long-term 
commitment to fostering local leadership and capacity is likely to be a key factor in 
achieving impacts with this type of extension approach. The local leader at the San 
site has been trained on site and abroad, and has established his own NGO in 
surrounding communities. Second, for precisely this reason, it will be difficult to scale 
up impacts from one village to many without supporting, coordinated investments by 
national public institutions and donors.  
This analysis has focused on statistical methods that reduce bias and the measurable, 
immediate impacts of DFF. Although farmer selection bias associated with 
participation has been taken into account, the findings cannot be generalized to other 
communities unless these communities conform to the criteria used to select sites. A 
more comprehensive evaluation, which would require the application of additional 
analytical approaches over a longer time period and in multiple locations – is not yet 
justified by the amount of funds invested in DFF nationwide. As more participatory 
research efforts are undertaken in Mali, however, these evaluations will be crucial.  AfJARE  Vol  4 No 1 March  2010                       Melinda Smale, Lamissa Diakité, Amadou Sidibé, Mikkel Grum,   
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Appendix: Additional statistics 
 
 
A. Probit and ordinary least squares regressions explaining DFF participation 
 
 
Determinants of DFF participation, probit regression  
Variable Coef.  Std.  Err.  P>z 
Site -1.8142 0.4309 0.0000
Active ratio  0.0240 0.7109 0.9730
Total asset value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0820
Millet share  0.7461 0.7198 0.3000
Per capita cash income  0.0000 0.0000 0.1060
Association membership  0.2040 0.1726 0.2370
Markets 0.5497 0.1402 0.0000
Koranic education  0.0439 0.0481 0.3610
Constant -0.6355 0.8339 0.4460
Number of obs  265    
LR chi2(8)  37.67    
Prob > chi2  0.0000    
Pseudo R2  0.2274    
Log likelihood   -63.970473      
 
 
Determinants of DFF participation, ordinary least squares regression  
   Coef.  Std. Err.  P>t 
Site -0.2320 0.0498 0.0000
Active ratio  0.0387 0.1011 0.7020
Total asset value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0190
Millet share  0.1133 0.0983 0.2500
Per capita cash income  0.0000 0.0000 0.0540
Association membership  0.0368 0.0247 0.1370
Markets 0.0783853 0.0195788 0.0000
Koranic education  0.0040264 0.0065585 0.5400
Constant 0.1531561 0.112754 0.1760
Number of obs  265    
F(  8,   256)  5.26    
Prob > F  0    
R-squared 0.1412    
Adj R-squared  0.1143    
Root MSE  0.2756      
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B. Comparison of means of outcome and explanatory variables, locus and other 
treatment villages, San site 
 
   Boumboro  Other treatment  P-value 
Expected millet yields  660 529 0.3318 
Expected sorghum yields  1014 673 0.0258 
Mean millet yield 2005-6  999 791 0.0263 
Mean sorghum yield 2005-6  822 705 0.3598 
Stock of attributes  30.74 29.46 0.032 
Relative deprivation  
(expected millet yields)  273 310 0.3308 
Relative deprivation  
(expected sorghum yields)  418 535 0.0258 
Relative deprivation  
(stock of attributes)  9.26 13.20 0.0389 
      
Explanatory variables      
Active ratio  0.609 0.651 0.3776 
Total asset value  1135337 859970 0.4561 
Millet share  0.605 0.518 0.1281 
Per capita income  36657 38035 0.8703 
Association membership  1.89 1.63 0.1418 
Markets 2.04 1.04 0.0001 
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This study investigates the impact of poverty, social capital and land tenure on the 
adoption of soil fertility management (SFM) and conservation technologies in 
Uganda. Considering four land management technologies (fallowing, terracing and 
inorganic and organic fertilizers), the study estimates a multinomial logit model to 
link farmers’ characteristics to the choice of technologies. The findings show that 
investments in land management are driven by factors such as land tenure security, 
level of poverty and participation in community organizations (social capital), and, 
most importantly, that household level poverty reduces the probability of adoption of 
most of the technologies, while social capital and land tenure security increase it. The 
findings suggest that more efficient government efforts to reduce poverty would 
enhance the adoption of SFM technologies. Other policies that would enhance the 
adoption of sustainable land management practices are infrastructure development, 
tenure security through a more efficient system of land registration, and investment in 
and use of social capital institutions.  
Keywords: poverty; social capital; property rights; soil fertility management; Uganda 
Cette étude examine l’impact de la pauvreté, du capital social et du régime foncier 
dans l’adoption d’une gestion de la fertilité du sol (SFM, en anglais) et les 
technologies de conservation en Ouganda. Prenant en considération quatre 
technologies de la gestion foncière (jachère, étagement, engrais biologiques et 
inorganiques), l’étude évalue le modèle logit multinomial pour relier les 
caractéristiques des fermiers au choix des technologies. Les conclusions montrent que 
les investissements en gestion foncière sont guidés par des facteurs comme la sécurité 
du régime foncier, le degré de pauvreté, la participation au sein des organisations 
communautaires (capital social) et, d’abord et avant tout, que le degré de pauvreté 
des ménages réduit la probabilité de l’adoption de la plupart des technologies, alors 
que le capital social et la sécurité du régime foncier l’augmentent. Les conclusions 
suggèrent que de plus amples efforts de la part du gouvernement, efficaces et destinés 
à réduire la pauvreté, encourageraient l’adoption de technologies SFM. D’autres 
politiques sont capables d’inciter l’adoption de pratiques en matière de gestion 
                                                 




foncière durable, à noter le développement de l’infrastructure, la sécurité foncière, 
grâce à un système plus efficace d’enregistrement des terres, et l’investissement dans 
et l’utilisation des institutions du capital social.  
Mots-clés : pauvreté ; capital social ; droits liés aux biens immobiliers ; gestion de la 
fertilité du sol ; Ouganda 
 
1. Introduction 
Reduction of poverty has become the major challenge for the international community 
over the coming few years (World Bank, 2001). While poverty is a global 
phenomenon, it is particularly pervasive in sub-Saharan Africa where in 2005 more 
than 46% and 70% of the population lived on less than $1 and $2 a day, respectively 
(World Bank, 2005; UNDP, 2005). As in many other developing countries, poverty is 
one of the major challenges facing policy makers in Uganda. Although poverty 
(measured in head count below the poverty line) in Uganda fell from 56% in 1992 to 
35% in 1999, more recent estimates indicate a national increase in poverty by four 
percentage points, reaching 39% in 2002 (Appleton & Sewanyana, 2003). About half 
of the rural households are classified as poor and poverty is more acute for crop 
farmers than for those practicing non-crop agriculture such as livestock and fishing 
(GoU, 2004). The fact that agriculture remains the key economic activity in Uganda 
(contributing 40% of the GDP, 85% of export earnings and 80% of employment) and 
the main source of livelihood for the vast majority of the population, especially in the 
large subsistence segment, indicates the importance of this sector’s performance for 
food security and poverty reduction (NEMA, 2002; GoU, 2004). 
Recent studies show that the major cause of low incomes in the rural areas of Uganda 
has been stagnating agricultural production (Deininger & Okidi, 2001). One major 
constraint to improved agricultural productivity in Uganda, as in many of the sub-
Saharan African countries, is land degradation. There is ample evidence of 
widespread land degradation in Uganda (NEMA, 2002; GOU, 2004), as manifested in 
high rates of soil nutrient loss, soil erosion and compaction and water logging 
(Nkonya et al., 2004). More than 85% of water contamination and more than 15% of 
biodiversity and topsoil loss have been attributed to soil erosion and deforestation. 
The extent of land degradation, however, varies between regions. For instance, while 
the Arua and Kapchorwa districts experience relatively fewer soil and land 
degradation problems, other districts such as Kabale and Kisoro are heavily eroded 
(GOU, 2002). The densely populated and extensively cultivated highlands and the 
overstocked cattle corridors of the severely de-vegetated drylands of Uganda are 
identified as the most fragile ecosystems in the country (NEMA, 2002).  
Exacerbated by poverty, a fast growing population, and inadequate tenure security, 
land degradation poses a threat to national and household food security and the 
overall welfare of the rural population in Uganda (Nkonya et al., 2004). Poverty acts 
as a constraining factor on households’ ability to invest in mitigating land 
degradation. Poor households are unable to compete for resources, including high 
quality and productive land, and are hence confined to marginal land that cannot 




(Kabubo-Mariara, 2003). The poor and food insecure households may contribute to 
land degradation because they are unable to keep land in fallow, make investments in 
land improvements or use costly external inputs (Reardon & Vosti, 1995). Due to 
credit constraints, inadequate tenure security and weak institutions, poverty can also 
cause farmers to take a short-term perspective, which limits incentives for long-term 
investments in soil conservation (Holden et al., 1998; Shiferaw & Holden, 1999).  
Access to land, the key productive asset for the rural population in Uganda, is 
extremely limited because of the very high fertility and population growth rates, 
which averaged 3.5% per annum over the past decade. Moreover, high degrees of 
uncertainty over tenure security prevail under some of Uganda’s key land tenure 
systems, and this reduces incentives to adopt land conservation practices and protect 
soil fertility by terracing, fallowing and applying manure and fertilizers. For example, 
the bulk of the land in Uganda is under customary systems governed by communal 
rules enforced by elders and clan leaders. 
Land degradation and poverty are bound to continue worsening in Uganda unless 
sound intervention policies are put in place. Designing appropriate intervention 
programs requires proper understanding of the factors that determine the adoption of 
land conservation practices. It is of particular interest to understand the role of poverty 
in land degradation. Given that government resources for eradicating poverty are 
limited, a more rational and effective way to allocate them would be to target specific 
aspects of poverty that critically limit farmers’ ability to invest in soil conservation 
and enhance agricultural productivity. In order to design appropriate interventions, it 
is also necessary to gain a deep understanding of the social and institutional 
environments in which policies to curb land degradation operate, as this will facilitate 
knowledge transfer, encourage cooperation, help to coordinate and monitor public 
service delivery, and make it easier for farmers to access credit, markets and farm 
equipment, all of which are important for the adoption and diffusion of agricultural 
technologies (Isham, 2000; Nyangena, 2005).  
In Uganda, studies investigating how social structures that vary from one village to 
another may affect the diffusion and adoption of SFM and conservation technologies 
are nonexistent despite the country’s wide heterogeneity of tribal affiliations and 
formal and informal social organizations. Very few attempts have so far been made to 
investigate the impact of poverty on adoption of soil conservation practices in 
Uganda. The only available studies (Nkonya et al., 2005) used binomial decision 
models, which treat adoption choices as being independent of each other and exclude 
useful economic information contained in the interdependence and simultaneity of 
adoption decisions. 
Applying a multinomial logit model (MNL) to a dataset purposefully collected by the 
World Bank and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), this study 
analyzes the way land tenure, property rights, social capital and poverty influence the 
adoption of SFM and conservation practices.  
A short survey of relevant theoretical and empirical literature is presented in Section 
2. Section 3 presents the analytical model used to estimate the determinants of SFM 
conservation practices in Uganda. Section 4 presents the data and discusses the choice 




are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper with some policy 
implications. 
 
2. The links between poverty, tenure security, social capital and land degradation 
Poverty and land degradation 
Many theoretical studies have conceptualized the connection between rural poverty 
and the environment as a ‘downward spiral’, where poverty coupled with population 
growth leads to environmental degradation and thus worsens poverty (Mink, 1993, 
Dasgupta, 1995; Scherr, 2000). Some of these studies argue that poor farmers are 
limited to labor intensive production strategies, as they are unable to use external 
inputs such as fertilizers to support sustainable intensification and are therefore 
destined to contribute to natural resource degradation. Even if it is endowed with 
some natural resource assets, a household may be poor if it lacks complementary 
assets such as human capital or physical and financial farm assets. Some attempts 
have been made to study the factors that reduce poverty and at the same time increase 
investment in land management (Reardon & Vosti, 1995; Duriappah, 1996; Barrett et 
al., 2005). 
Land tenure security and investment in SFM and conservation 
The literature also tends to suggest that incomplete property rights reinforce the 
poverty-environment vicious circle (Duriappah, 1996; Scherr, 1999). This line of 
argument proposes that insecure tenure rights to land and the imperfect functioning of 
land markets tend to reduce incentives for smaller rural farmers to invest in long-term 
conservation measures such as planting trees, and soil conservation structures. 
Surprisingly, despite the well-thought-out theoretical links, the results from studies 
that link tenure security and investment in conservation activities are contradictory 
and inconclusive. For instance, some studies argue that tenure security is not 
important for conservation (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991; Brasselle et al., 2002), while 
others argue that it is (Shiferaw & Holden, 1999; Place & Otsuka, 2000; Gabremedhin 
& Swinton, 2003; Kabubo-Mariara, 2003). These different findings are the result of 
differences either in the way tenure security is measured or in the way the relationship 
between investments and tenure rights is empirically conceptualized (Kabubo-
Mariara, 2003). 
Social capital and investment in SFM and conservation 
Empirical studies show that greater social capital, acquired through information 
sharing and collective action, results in improved adoption and diffusion of 
technology (Isham, 2000; Nyangena, 2005). Reid and Salmen (2000) found that while 
all aspects of trust were important in explaining the level and extent of technology 
adoption, social cohesion in the form of attending social and church meetings and 
cooperating in providing public goods creates the ground for external inputs such as 
agricultural extension to take root. Women’s organizations were also found to be 




Isham (2000) showed that in rural Tanzania tribal-based social affiliations act as a 
form of social capital in the adoption decision. A household in a community within 
which there is greater ethnic homogeneity and greater member participation in 
decision making is more likely to adopt.  
Other factors that influence investment in SFM and conservation  
Many studies have found a strong association between household assets and 
environmental problems (Reardon & Vosti, 1995; Swinton & Quiroz, 2003). The 
characteristics of the natural resource base are also important in explaining the 
pathway from poverty to environmental degradation. The agricultural landscape for 
each different agro-ecological zone is typically quite distinct, and each therefore 
carries its own distinct risks of resource degradation, and offers its own distinct 
opportunities for intensification, diversification and land improvement (Scherr, 2000). 
In Ethiopia, for example, Bekele and Drake (2003) found that slope of the plot has a 
positive correlation with all types of conservation structures.  
Lack of farmer awareness has been found to be a significant constraint to positive 
adaptation to environmental changes and also to making appropriate investments in 
land for conservation, especially where degradation effects are not easily observable 
and where resource degradation is not a local concern but a negative externality to 
outsiders, such as downstream sedimentation (Scherr, 2000).  
 
3. The analytical framework for modeling farmers’ decisions to adopt SFM and 
conservation practices 
Many previous studies have modeled the decision to adopt conservation technology 
as a binary choice process (Place & Otsuka, 2000; Kabubo-Mariara, 2003, 2005; 
Pender et al., 2004; Nkonya et al., 2005). Using such bivariate models excludes 
useful economic information contained in the interdependent and simultaneous 
adoption decisions (Dorfman, 1996; Wu & Babcock, 1998; Bekele & Drake, 2003). 
It is therefore important to treat adoption of soil conservation measures and adoption 
of soil nutrient enhancing technologies as multiple-choice decisions made 
simultaneously.  
Multinomial probit (MNP) and multinomial logit (MNL) models provide alternative 
approaches to analysis of land management decisions because such decisions are 
usually made jointly. They can also be used to evaluate the alternative combinations 
of management practices, as well as individual practices (Wu & Babcock, 1998). 
MNP models are, however, not commonly used, since it is difficult to compute the 
multivariate normal probabilities for any dimensionality higher than two, i.e. more 
than two (bimodal) choices (Greene, 2000).  
In the present study, farmers’ adoption of land management practices is modeled 
using an MNL model. Zilberman (1985) used this model to examine choices of 
irrigation technologies in California and Bekele and Drake (2003) used it to examine 




Households’ adoption of soil conservation and nutrient enhancing technologies can 
be evaluated on the basis of alternative decision choices, which can easily be linked 
to utility. According to Greene (2000), the unordered choice model could be 
motivated by a random utility framework, where for the i
th household faced with j 




j ij X U              ( 1 )  
 
where Uij is the utility of household i derived from technology choice j, Xij is a vector 
of factors that explain the decision made, and 
'
j   is a set of parameters that reflect the 
impact of changes in Xij on Uij. The disturbance terms εij are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed. If farmers choose technology j, then Uij is 
the maximum among all possible utilities. This means that 
 
, ij ik UU kj              ( 2 )  
 
where  ik U  is the utility to the i
th farmer from technology k. Equation (2) means that 
when each technology is thought of as a possible adoption decision, farmers will be 
expected to choose the technology that maximizes their utility given available 
alternatives (Dorfman, 1996). The choice of j depends on Xij, which includes aspects 
specific to the household and plot, among other factors. Following Greene (2000), if 
Yi is a random variable that indicates the choice made, then the MNL form of the 




















, j  =  0,  1,  2.         (3) 
 
Estimating equation (3) provides a set of probabilities for j+1 technology choices for 
a decision maker with characteristics Xij. The equation can be normalized by 
assuming that β0= 0, in which case the probabilities can be estimated as 
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Normalizing on any other probabilities yields the following log-odds ratio: 
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In this case, the dependent variable is the log of one alternative relative to the 
base/reference alternative. 
The coefficients in an MNL model are difficult to interpret, so the marginal effects of 
the explanatory variables on the choice of alternative management strategies are 
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The sign of these marginal effects may not be the same as the sign of respective 
coefficients as they depend on the sign and magnitude of all other coefficients. The 
marginal probabilities measure the expected change in the probability of a particular 
choice being selected with respect to a unit change in an independent variable (Long, 
1997; Greene, 2000). Also important to note is that in an MNL model the marginal 
probabilities resulting from a unit change in an independent variable must sum to 
zero, since the expected increases in marginal probabilities for certain options induces 
a decrease for the other options within a set. 
 
4. Data and empirical methods 
This study used two datasets. First, we had access to data from a survey conducted in 




Statistics to provide an understanding of the links between natural resource 
management and poverty in Uganda. The IFPRI survey covered rural areas in eight 
districts in Uganda: Arua, Iganga, Kabale, Kapchorwa, Lira, Masaka, Mbarara and 
Soroti (Table 1). The districts were chosen to represent a wide range of social, 
economic, environmental and institutional circumstances. The IFPRI survey collected 
information on plot and household characteristics as well as these households’ 
participation in agrarian associations.  
The IFPRI data, however, did not cover key variables such as education and gender 
and did not collect information on household expenditure. This information was 
therefore obtained from a second dataset, the 2000 Uganda National Household 
Survey (UNHS), since the two datasets had common identifiers. The UNHS covered 
all districts surveyed under the IFPRI project. A sample of 9,711 households was 
randomly selected from 972 enumeration areas (565 rural and 407 urban) in 
proportion to the population density of each district. The IFPRI data on the other hand 
covered a subsample of 851 households from 123 enumeration areas (all rural, given 
the focus of their study). Many of the observations had missing values and a large 
number of questionnaires were left out since they had incomplete or unreliable 
information (a high percentage of outliers), with the result that there were only 2110 
usable data units. 
4.1 Choice of explanatory variables and model implementation 
Controlling for the effect of poverty  
This study uses the level of per capita household expenditure to construct appropriate 
measures of poverty. This is one of the most widely used approaches to measuring 
poverty (Geda et al., 2001; Mukherjee & Benson, 2003). To compute this variable the 
study uses data from the 2002 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). The per 
capita household expenditure is expressed in real terms, normalized using 1989 as the 
base year.  
Using the generated per capita household expenditure, the households in the sample 
are classified into two categories (poor/non-poor) using the standard national poverty 
lines (calculated on the basis of the people’s food calories requirements adjusted by a 
mark-up for non-food requirements). Different poverty lines are used for different 
regions to take into account differences in staple foods consumed, tastes and 
consumption preferences, and price differences (Appleton & Sewanyana, 2003).  
The literature postulates that poverty and adoption of various land management 
technologies are reciprocally interrelated. On the one hand, poverty determines the 
level of adoption of particular technologies. On the other, however, the level of 
adoption may have implications for land productivity and consequently for poverty. 
Introducing poverty on the right-hand side therefore introduces an endogeneity 
problem. Treatment of endogeneity in non-linear models cannot be pursued using the 
instrumental variables approach, as commonly used in linear models. Two-stage least-
squares probit and logit models have been widely used to correct for endogeneity in 




Controlling for social capital impacts  
The study uses one critical component of social capital, namely participation in 
agrarian associations such as production, supra-community and social groups. 
Membership of these associations has been widely used in the literature to measure 
social capital (Putnam et al., 1993; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999; Grootaert, 1999; 
Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Grootaert et al., 1999). Putnam et al. (1993) argue that 
participation in social groups may lead to transmission of knowledge and may 
increase aggregate human capital and the development of trust, which improves the 
functioning of markets.  
Since different social organizations play different roles in the lives of rural 
communities, it is important to establish which particular institutions may be more 
related to adoption of agricultural technologies and which particular technology. To 
achieve this objective, a dummy variable (membership in production institutions) is 
used in the adoption model.  
Controlling for the impacts of land tenure  
It is hypothesized that insecure land tenure is a disincentive for farmers to invest in 
land improvements and conservation and therefore decreases agricultural 
productivity. In this study, land tenure measured by the right to bequeath land to next 
generations (an indicator of long-term tenure security) is used as the control for the 
effect of land tenure. 
Other explanatory variables  
Examination of the literature on adoption of soil conservation and fertility enhancing 
technologies in Africa suggests that choices among the different technologies depend 
on household attributes (level of poverty and asset endowments, access to 
information, household size, age and education of household head), institutional 
factors (land tenure, social capital) and plot level characteristics (state of soil 
nutrients, slope, farm size) (Shiferaw & Holden, 1998; Pender et al., 2004; Kabubo-
Mariara, 2005; Nkonya et al., 2005). The set of regressors that were chosen, their 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Specification of the land management decisions MNL model 
An MNL model for land management practices was estimated using data collected 
from all the eight districts. The complete choice set (response variable) for the MNL 
model gives 16 factorial combinations of possible outcomes (Table 2). However, it is 
clear from Table 1 that farmers who combine different soil conservation and fertility 
management practices represent a very small percentage (an average of 3.43%). This 
meant that modeling all possible combination outcomes results in very small sample 
units in many of the combination outcomes. We therefore decided to group all choices 
other than only fallowing (outcome 1), only using organic fertilizers (outcome 2), 
only using inorganic fertilizers (outcome 3), only terracing (outcome 4), or none, i.e. 
no adoption (outcome 16) into one other alternative choice outcome (i.e. all possible 
combinations of choices – outcomes 5 to 15 in Table 2). Accordingly, the set of 
outcomes for the response variable was limited to six land management technology 
choices: (i) fallowing only (ii) using only organic fertilizer (iii) using only inorganic 
fertilizer, (iv) only terracing (v) using a combination of SFM practices and (vi) 
continuous cropping without any land management (i.e. no adoption of any of the 
land fertility management practices – outcome 16 of Table 2, which is used as the 
reference choice for comparing the marginal effects of other choice outcomes). 
‘Terracing’ here means using stones (fanya juu), or bench (fanya chini) types of 
terraces. ‘Organic fertilizer’ means mulch, animal manure, household refuse, biomass 
transfer and cover crops. ‘Inorganic fertilizer’ means N fertilizer (urea, ammonium 
nitrate), P fertilizer (SSP, DAP and TSP) and composite fertilizers (NPK). These 
technologies were chosen because they are commonly used in Uganda as land 
management practices (see Table 2) or are being promoted for use through the 




Table 2: Alternative outcomes as possible combinations of land fertility 
management practices defining modeled decision choices (where 1 means that 










1 1 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 
3 0 0 1 0 
4 0 0 0 1 
5 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 0 
7 1 1 0 0 
8 1 1 0 1 
9 1 0 1 1 
10 1  0  0  1 
11 1  0  1  0 
12 0  1  1  0 
13 0  1  0  1 
14 0  1  1  1 
15 0  0  1  1 
16 0  0  0  0 
 
Before empirical estimation of the MNL model, the independent variables were 
scrutinized for possible correlations since multicollinearity is a common problem with 
such datasets. Distance to the nearest all-weather road and distance to the nearest 
seasonal road were found to be strongly correlated with distance to markets. Also, 
main source of income was correlated with non-farm income; and ethnic dominance 
and origin of farmers’ association (whether local or foreign) showed a strong 
correlation with membership. These variables were therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
A two-stage econometric process was used to correct for endogeneity caused by the 
endogenous regressors being correlated with the error term. In the first stage, a 
poverty model was estimated using the probit
2 maximum likelihood procedure. In the 
second stage, fitted values of the endogenous variable (poverty) were computed using 
the first stage parameter estimates and used as regressors (instruments) in the MNL 
adoption model to estimate the determinants of technology adoption.  
The other problem common in cross-section data analysis is heteroscedasticity. This 
study used White’s heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix (HCCM) to 
correct for heteroscedasticity of an unknown form (White, 1980). The study specifies 
the Huber-White sandwich estimator to correct for heteroscedasticity. Long (1997) 
                                                 
2 Logit estimation is also appropriate for analysing binary response data. There is therefore no apriori 




argues that the HCCM provides a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of the 
slope coefficients in the presence of heteroscedasticity and can be used to avoid its 
adverse effects on hypothesis testing even when nothing is known about the form of 
heteroscedasticity. 
MNL models are very commonly used for estimating polychotomous choice models 
because of their relative ease of estimation and interpretation. However, the MNL 
imposes a rather restrictive assumption known as the irrelevance of independent 
alternatives (IIA) assumption. This assumption implies that the ratio of the utility 
levels between two choices, say organic fertilizer and inorganic fertilizer, remains the 
same irrespective of the number of choices available. The Hausman test (Hausman & 
McFadden, 1984) was used to check whether the IIA assumption is violated. The test 
results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence, suggesting the 
use of MNL is appropriate. Stata software (StataCorp, 2005) was used to implement 
the econometric analysis. 
 
5. Results of the multinomial analyses of determinants of adoption of land 
improvement and conservation practices 
This section discusses the results of the econometric analyses of the links between 
poverty (measured as members of the population falling below the poverty line), 
property rights,
3 social capital
4 and the land management practices of farmers in 
Uganda. The estimated MNL coefficients showing marginal effects and P-levels are 
presented in Table 3.  
                                                 
3 Security (insecurity) of tenure or property rights means having (not having) the right to bequeath land 
to the next generation.  




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Most of the explanatory variables are statistically significant at 10% or less and have 
the expected signs except for a few surprise outcomes discussed below. Generally the 
results show that poverty hinders the adoption of SFM and conservation technologies. 
Poverty is negatively related to adoption of organic fertilizer, inorganic fertilizer, 
terracing and a combination of terracing and other SFM practices. The magnitudes of 
the estimated marginal effects of poverty indicate that, compared to other factors, 
poverty has a very strong influence on the adoption of these practices. Poverty is also 
found to positively influence the probability of non-adoption of any technology. The 
negative association between poverty and technology adoption suggests that poverty 
is a key constraint to adoption of land management technologies, which supports the 
findings of earlier, related studies (Li et al., 1998; Shiferaw & Holden, 1998, 1999). 
However, it could also be a reflection of poor targeting of technologies, since the 
national extension services in Uganda have been blamed for targeting the rich and 
neglecting the poor (Hassan & Poonyth, 2001). These findings suggest that 
government efforts to reduce poverty would improve adoption of conservation and 
SFM practices. More important is to target the needs of poor farmers when 
developing and disseminating SFM technologies. 
The results also suggest a positive relationship between adoption of fallowing and 
poverty. This is a rather surprising result, because it suggests that the poor may adopt 
fallowing more than the rich, who are expected to have more land. However, there 
may be two explanations for this finding. First, sample descriptive statistics showed 
that there is no significant difference in farm size between the different income 
quintiles. In fact, the results show further that poor districts such as Lira and Soroti 
have on average larger farms than better-off districts, because the poor districts of the 
north have a low population density and hence more land is available. It is also 
important to note that the poor usually have limited choices, given the cost 
implications of the alternative of intensification through external inputs such as 
inorganic fertilizers.  
The right to bequeath land to future generations is seen as an indicator of long-term 
tenure security and as a result encourages farmers to have longer planning horizons. 
As expected, we find that long-term tenure security positively influences adoption of 
fallowing, organic fertilizer application, terracing and a combination of terracing and 
other SFM technologies, generally reducing the probability of non-adoption. This 
suggests that policies that facilitate and encourage tenure security, such as easing the 
land registration and titling processes in order to ensure long-term tenure security, can 
significantly increase the probability of adoption of SFM and provide incentives for 
investment in conservation activities.  
However, a negative relationship was found between land tenure and adoption of 
inorganic fertilizer. This suggests that farmers prefer to use inorganic fertilizer on less 
secure land to maximize short-term benefits and reserve other inputs for owned plots 
with long-term security. Similar results were found by Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) 
in Ethiopia.  
Membership of production associations was found to be positively related to the 
likelihood of adopting fallowing, terracing and use of inorganic fertilizer and 




suggest that investment in and promotion of social capital institutions such as 
production associations is important for encouraging the adoption of SFM and 
conservation technologies.  
Two policy implications of these outcomes are clear. First, development projects 
should not be designed to deal with all communities uniformly, but should be adapted 
to different levels of existing social institutions and norms. Second, extension workers 
need to understand the social and institutional fabric of their areas of work. They 
should promote and exploit the existing social infrastructure to disseminate 
information about new technologies and encourage cooperative action in areas of 
resource pooling such as labor sharing and savings.  
The results of this study show a negative relationship between membership of 
production associations (savings and credit associations, rotating credit schemes, 
farmers’ groups and women’s groups) and the adoption of organic fertilizer. Of these 
categories, membership in the first two (savings and credit) constitutes 60% of the 
total membership. Availability of credit through these organizations to support SFM 
alternatives to the labor intensive organic fertilizer could therefore be the reason. In 
the districts of Arua and Kapchorwa, where inorganic fertilizer is mostly used, 
production associations such as farmers’ groups are directly involved in procuring 
inorganic fertilizer and distributing it to the members, which promotes the use of 
purchased inputs and hence there is less need for organic sources.  
The results show that, although farmers’ access to information is positively related to 
most of the practices, agricultural extension does not significantly affect the adoption 
of most of the technologies other than the use of inorganic fertilizer. Prior adoption 
studies in Uganda (Nkonya et al., 2005) have come up with similar findings. There 
may be two reasons for this weak relationship between extension and adoption 
decisions. First, the extension system in Uganda has been packaged to promote the 
use of inorganic fertilizer, in an effort to intensify agricultural production, and, 
second, the extension services are inadequate and sometimes completely lacking. For 
instance, only 28% of the sampled households had had a single visit by an extension 
agent over a period of one year. The policy implication of this outcome is that there is 
a need to revitalize the extension services and ensure that they support the use of 
traditional SFM and conservation technologies that are more readily available to the 
farmers.  
The positive and significant relationship between household size and adoption of 
organic fertilizer and terracing suggests that households that are endowed with family 
labor tend to use labor intensive management practices. The negative relationship 
between household size and fallowing could be attributed to the fact that larger 
households tend to have smaller farms and hence cannot afford to fallow but must use 
other SFM practices. Farmer’s age was significantly and positively related to adoption 
of fallowing, but negatively related to adoption of inorganic fertilizer. One possible 
explanation for this outcome could be that older farmers are more risk averse and 
therefore resistant to changing to newer technologies since they are more used to 
traditional management systems.  
Education was negatively related to adoption of terracing and inorganic fertilizer, 




management practices. A possible explanation for this outcome is that education 
improves access to alternative livelihood strategies such as non-farm activities, which 
may increase the labor opportunity cost and compete with agricultural production 
(Nkonya et al., 2004).  
In fact, non-farm income was found to be positively related to adoption of fallowing 
but negatively related to adoption of inorganic fertilizer, terracing, a combination of 
terracing and other SFM technologies, and organic fertilizer. This is another 
surprising result, since non-farm income is expected to provide the much-needed cash 
to buy external inputs, but consistent with the results of earlier analyses (Nkonya et 
al., 2005). There are two possible explanations for this outcome. First, agriculture is 
generally not profitable in Uganda (Nkonya, 2002) and this discourages investment in 
SFM and conservation. Second, since non-farm activities are generally more 
profitable and are full-time activities and sometimes located away from the farm, they 
take away the much needed farm labor. Non-farm activities eventually become the 
key source of family livelihood. As Haggblade et al. (1989) argue, initially farmers 
integrate non-farm activities with farming activities on a seasonal or part-time basis. 
Returns from non-farm activities are invested in farming activities but eventually, 
because of increases in demand for non-farm goods, those involved in non-farm 
activities break away from farming to become involved in non-farm activities on a 
full-time basis.  
Agro-climatic zones stand out as an important factor that could explain differential 
use of SFM and conservation technologies in the study areas. For instance, the 
likelihood of using fallowing and inorganic fertilizer in the bimodal agro-climatic 
zones is 27.63 and 9.69%, respectively – lower than in unimodal agro-climatic zones. 
As noted earlier, most districts in the unimodal zones are sparsely populated, so 
fallowing is more likely here than in the densely populated districts in the bimodal 
zones. The likelihood of using inorganic fertilizer is also higher in the unimodal agro-
climatic zones because of the organized input supply for maize and barley farmers in 
the Kapchorwa district and tobacco farmers in the Arua district, and the better 
extension services in the Soroti district.  
In general, having more plots reduces the probability of non-adoption. Having more 
plots is an indicator of a larger farm size, which allows the farmer to practice terracing 
and fallowing quite easily. A major problem in the densely populated highland 
districts is that terraces are occupying a large amount of productive space and so they 
are being destroyed. However, the results also show a negative relationship between 
number of plots and organic fertilizer use. This is again as expected, since the use of 
bulky manure on many plots involves high transport and distribution costs. 
Overall, longer distances from homesteads to plots increase the probability of non-
adoption, since using organic fertilizer is a labor intensive activity – the greater the 
distance, the greater the labor needs and associated costs of transport and distribution. 
Farmers therefore choose to use less costly technologies such as fallowing and 
inorganic fertilizer in far-off plots and more labor intensive organic fertilizer in plots 
close to their homesteads.  
As expected, distance to markets was found to reduce the probability of adopting 




of terracing and other SFM technologies. Far-off markets imply high costs of 
transactions for both inputs and outputs. The high costs, coupled with the level of 
poverty, therefore reduce the probability of using marketed inputs such as inorganic 
fertilizer while increasing the use of traditional technologies such as fallowing. These 
findings suggest that road infrastructure development would increase adoption of 
marketed inputs. 
Ownership of livestock has a limited impact on most land management technologies 
and is only positively and significantly related to adoption of terracing. Surprisingly, 
we do not find that livestock ownership has a positive and significant impact on 
adoption of organic fertilizer. The explanation for this may be that in areas where 
households keep cattle, which produce a significant amount of manure, the farmers 
are nomads for whom livestock is the main source of income or are not seriously 
involved in crop agriculture except for small subsistence gardens, and in areas where 
households keep sheep and goats and other small animals, the farmers may be 
involved in crop agriculture but their animals produce only small amounts of manure. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper analyzes the impact of poverty, social capital and land tenure on the 
adoption of SFM and conservation activities. To capture the interdependence and joint 
nature of adoption decisions, we performed an MNL analysis that generated findings 
that suggest the following, 
1)  Poverty increases the probability of non-adoption of technologies in general 
and particularly reduces the probability of adopting organic and inorganic 
fertilizers and terracing, mainly because the poor have limited access to cash 
and markets and lower land and livestock assets. This finding suggests that 
government programs to reduce poverty would go a long way to promote the 
use of SFM and conservation practices. 
2)  Land tenure security is positively correlated with the adoption of fallowing 
and organic fertilizer use but generally reduces the probability of non-adoption 
of land management technologies. However, it was not found to significantly 
influence the adoption of inorganic fertilizer and terracing. These results also 
suggest that programs that enhance tenure security, such as land registration, 
would encourage the adoption of most land management practices. 
3)  We also find that participation in social institutions generally tends to increase 
the probability of adopting some land management practices. This finding is 
especially important in Uganda, where social capital issues are not well 
researched or incorporated into government policy. Investment in social 
capital is therefore of paramount importance for the adoption of land 
management technologies. The policy implication here is that extension 
workers should understand the social and institutional fabric of the places 
where they work, and they need to articulate the relevance of promoted 
technologies to the local social context so that the villagers become more 




therefore, development projects should not be designed so that they deal with 
all communities uniformly, but be adapted to take advantage of existing social 
institutions and norms. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the demand for meat in Egypt for the period 1990–2005 using the 
linearized Almost Ideal Demand System to estimate own-price, cross-price and 
expenditure elasticities. It found that the Marshallian own-price elasticity was the 
highest for fish, followed by chicken, beef and duck. On the other hand, the cross-
price elasticity of beef showed a complementary relationship with the other meat 
types, except for fish, which is substitutive. Chicken and fish showed a substitutive 
relationship with all other meat types. Duck showed a substitutive relationship with 
all meats except rabbit. Mutton and rabbit showed a versatile relationship with the 
other meat types. The highest substitutive relationship was between mutton and beef. 
Compensated own-price elasticity estimates showed similar trends but smaller values 
than uncompensated ones, which is theoretically consistent.  
Keywords: meat; Almost Ideal Demand System; seemingly unrelated regressions; 
Egypt 
Cet article analyse la demande en viande, en Egypte pour la période 1990–2005 à 
l’aide du système A.I.D.S. linéarisé, afin d’évaluer les élasticités en matière de 
dépense, de prix croisé et de prix de l’offre. L’étude a montré que l’élasticité 
marshallienne du prix de l’offre était la plus élevée pour le poisson, suivie du poulet, 
du bœuf et du canard. D’autre part, l’élasticité du prix croisé pour le bœuf a révélé 
une relation complémentaire avec les autres types de viande, excepté pour le poisson, 
qui est substitutive. Le poulet et le poisson ont montré une relation substitutive avec 
tous les autres types de viande. Le canard a montré une relation substitutive avec 
toutes les viandes excepté le lapin. Le mouton et le lapin ont montré une relation 
versatile avec les autres types de viande. La relation substitutive la plus importante 
est celle entre le mouton et le bœuf. Les estimations de l’élasticité du prix de l’offre 
compensé ont révélé des tendances similaires avec cependant des valeurs moindres 
que celles non compensées, ce qui en théorie demeure cohérent.  
Mots-clés : viande ; Système A.I.D.S. (Almost Ideal Demand System)  ; régressions 
apparemment sans lien ; Egypte 
 
                                                 





A wide range of factors, notably globalization and economic growth, have changed 
the lifestyle of developing countries in general, and Egypt in particular, in the 
direction of western or developed countries’ lifestyles and diets. Such factors have not 
only increased meat consumption but also changed meat consumption patterns.  
The way consumers allocate consumption expenditure among goods and services is of 
particular interest to economists. In developed countries, meat demand has been 
studied extensively. In developing countries, however, studies of this topic are often 
restricted by the data insufficiency of the past decades. 
In reviewing studies of meat demand in Egypt we noted two points. Firstly, these 
studies divided meat into three major categories, red meat, white meat and fish, 
ignoring the estimation of demand parameters of each category’s components (e.g. 
Mohamed, 2000; Ragab, 2005). As such classification gives only general estimates, it 
does not produce an accurate or detailed specification of meat demand in Egypt. 
Secondly, the adopted methodology concentrated only on the estimation of a single 
demand equation even though there are doubts about the reliability of the results 
obtained by this method. 
The main aim of this paper is to produce more reliable demand parameter estimates of 
meat in Egypt. The reliability may be achieved by addressing the two points of 
weakness mentioned above. We therefore adopted the Linear Approximated Almost 
Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS) methodology to estimate the demand for all meat 
types in Egypt. This methodology is concerned mainly with estimating own-price, 
cross-price and expenditure elasticities. The AIDS specification proposed by Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980) is commonly used to estimate the price and income elasticities 
of the demand for goods when expenditure share data are available.  
 
2. Data 
Seven main types of meat are consumed in Egypt: beef, mutton, rabbit, chicken, duck, 
turkey and fish. The study excludes turkey as consumption of this meat is very low 
and there is insufficient data, and pork is not included because most Egyptian people 
are Muslims. 
The data used for the econometric estimation are annual and were constructed by the 
authors on the basis of FAO statistics (FAO, undated) and publications of the 
Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA, various dates). The study covers the period 
1990 to 2005. 
 
3. Characteristics of meat consumption in Egypt 
The FAO statistics show that in 2005 the daily per capita protein consumption in 
Egypt in 2005 was 107  gm/capita/day. Only 15.1  gm were of animal origin, 
distributed as 4.73 gm from red meat, 5.77 gm from poultry, 0.7 gm from milk and 




Figure 1 shows that for the past two decades, with few exceptions, the annual per 
capita consumption of meat has been increasing gradually. Consumption of red meat 
increased with some fluctuations from 10.13  kg/capita/year in 1990 to 
14.6 kg/capita/year in 2000. There was a noticeable decrease between 2001 and 2005, 
down to 12.14 kg/capita/year in 2001, with a further decrease to 11.38 kg/capita/year 
by 2005.One of the main reasons for this was Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE, widely known as ‘mad cow disease’). Although the first BSE case was detected 
in 1986 in the UK, the disease caused fear among consumers in Egypt in 2001 and 
significantly decreased the demand for beef, and there were governmental polices 
restricting the import of beef from the infected markets. 
White meat showed a gradual increase in per capita consumption through the period 
1990–2005, from 4.64 kg/capita/year in 1990 to 12.12 kg/capita/year in 2005 – an 
increase of 0.5 kg/capita/year on average. The highest values reached in 2001 and 
2002, 13.2 kg/capita/year and 13.3 kg/capita/year respectively, were probably due to 
the dramatic reduction in beef demand caused by BSE. The annual per capita 
consumption of fish showed significant increase, almost doubling from 
7.98  kg/capita/year in 1990 and to 15.55  kg/capita/year in 2005 – an increase of 
0.51 kg/capita/year on average. The steep increase in 2001 was probably also due to 




Figure 1: Per capita meat consumption in Egypt (1990–2005) 
 
Table 1 shows the expenditure shares for each type of meat. The highest expenditure 
share is for beef (0.388), followed by fish (0.34), which implies that beef and fish 
represent about 73% of the total expenditure on all types of meat in Egypt. 
 




Table 1: Summary statistics of expenditure shares for meat consumption (1990-
2005)  
Meat   Mean  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
      
Beef 0.388  0.286  0.468    0.042 
Chicken 0.135 0.065 0.168 0.034 
Mutton  0.062 0.031 0.085 0.019 
Duck  0.041 0.031 0.050 0.006 
Fish  0.341 0.291 0.430 0.036 




Alston and Chalfant (1993) state that two demand systems have gained prominence in 
demand analysis, especially in the field of agricultural economics: the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) and the Rotterdam model. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) 
convert the nonlinear AIDS into a simplified linear AIDS (LA/AIDS) model by using 
the Stone’s price index to replace the nonlinear price index. Because of its simplicity 
and lighter computational burden, this model is very popular for empirical demand 
analysis (Green & Alston, 1990). 
This study therefore adopted the LA/AIDS model. We estimate the system of 
equations using the Restricted Seemingly Unrelated Regression (RSUR) method with 
the homogeneity and symmetry conditions imposed. The procedures for the model 
estimation are as follows. 
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where  i   represents the share allotted to i
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expenditure,  i  ,  ij   and  i   are RSUR parameter estimates for the LA/AIDS 
model, i   is the random or error term., and   P  is the translog price index defined by 
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It is clear that the translog price index complicates the model. Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980) suggested the Stone’s price index, which can be used instead of the translog 
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If we substitute the Stone’s price index (equation 3) for the translog price index in 
equation 1, we then have 
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As can be seen in equation 4, this substitution causes a simultaneity problem, because 
the dependent variable ( i  ) also appears on the right-hand side of the LA/AIDS. 
Eales & Unnevehr (1988, 1994) suggested using the lagged share ( 1 ,  t i  ) for equation 
4. Replacing equation 3 with the lagged shares in equation 1 yields the LA/AIDS, 
given by 
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Since budget shares sum to one, we impose the following set of restrictions on the 
parameter of the AIDS model: 
1)  Adding up implies:  0 0 1
1 1 1
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i  , which is obvious from equation 1.  
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3)  Symmetry is satisfied if  ji ij     for any two goods i and j . 
As the present study focuses on the response of the demand for different meat types to 
changes in price and expenditure, the elasticities have been calculated at the sample 
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A positive value suggests that good i is normal. The income compensated or net 
(Hicksian) own-price elasticities ( ii  ) and cross-price elasticities ( ij  ) respectively 
are obtained by applying the Slutsky decomposition to (8) and using the price index in 
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Consumer theory suggests that compensated own-price elasticities are negative for 
normal goods. Moreover, if (7) and (10) are positive the two goods are cross 
substitutes, otherwise they are complements. 
Using the Slutsky equation again, it is possible to derive a relationship between the 
compensated cross-price elasticities and the expenditure elasticities as follows: 
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The sign of  ij   determines whether the goods i and j are complements or substitutes. 
If  ij  is positive the two goods are substitutes, whereas if it is negative the two goods 
are complements. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 This section describes the results of two tests: the time series properties, derived from 
the well-known Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) that 
establishes whether the time series of all variables are stationary or not, and the 
empirical results from the structural breaks test. 
5.1 Time series properties 
Each time series variable included in a model should be tested for its time series 
properties. We used two tests to investigate the time series properties of the dataset: 
the unit root test, to examine the stationarity of the dependent variables, and the 
structural breaks test to examine the expenditure share variables (dependent variables) 
over the time series. 
Unit root test 
This tests whether a time series variable is non-stationary, using an autoregressive 
model. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test constructs a parametric correction for 
higher-order correlation by assuming that the series follows an AR(k) process and 
adding the lagged difference terms of the dependent variable to the right-hand side of 
the test regression: 


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k
j
t t j t t y d y c y
1
1 1          (13) 
Equation 13 tests for the null of a unit root against a mean-stationary alternative in yt 
where y refers to the time series examined. The test results are presented in Table 2. 
The results confirmed that the null hypotheses are rejected for all variables. 
Consequently, all the variables used in the LA/AIDS model are integrated to the order 
one I(1), which means the time series of all variables are stationary at the difference 
one.  




Table 2: Unit root test results for meat expenditure shares in Egypt (1990–2005) 
Variable 
Budget shares  Prices 
Lags  Test statistics  Lags  Test statistics 
Beef 5  -1.38  5  -1.95 
Chicken 5  -2.17  5  -2.21 
Mutton 5  -1.07  4  -2.01 
Ducks 4  -1.64  4  -1.88 
Fish 5  -1.25  5  -2.30 
Rabbits 5  -2.51  3  -3.95 
Expenditure 5  -0.83     
Note: 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.9949. The order is selected by 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Structural breaks test 
Jha and Sharma (2001) state that structural breaks are a result of some event 
significantly affecting the variables being studied. Such breaks can lead to a 
permanent shift in the level or slope (or both) of the series but the basic nature of the 
series remains unchanged.  
To detect periods in which structural breaks occur, we examined a set of residuals 
from the fitted LA/AIDS share equations (equation 5), and the structural breaks are 
then the period(s) where the residuals exceeded two standard deviations. 
 
Table 3: Structural breaks of the expenditure share for meat in Egypt (1990–
2005) 
Year Beef  Chicken  Mutton  Duck Fish 
1990  - - - - - 
1991 -0.155 -0.305 -0.036 -0.140 0.457 
1992 0.602 0.309 -0.361 0.133 -0.946 
1993 0.371 0.025 0.407 0.137 -0.514 
1994  -0.660 0.441 0.109 0.389 0.192 
1995 -0.527 -0.010 -0.290 0.065  0.573 
1996 -0.085 -0.079 -0.397 -0.556 0.378 
1997 -0.277 -0.552 -0.360 -0.225 0.896 
1998 -0.452 -0.070 -0.379 -0.250 0.717 
1999 -0.095 0.324 -0.500 0.212 -0.297 
2000 -0.813 0.050 -0.115 0.311 0.725 
2001 1.718 -0.194 0.269 0.129 -1.882 
2002  0.597 -0.019 -0.169 -0.095 -0.518 
2003 0.333 0.014 -0.562 0.155 -0.396 
2004 0.264 0.147 -0.583  -0.117  -0.383 





The results presented in Table 3 show that there are no structural breaks within any 
period of the expenditure share variables (dependent variables). The maximum break 
in beef occurred in 2001, as expected, by 1.718. Consequently, the maximum breaks 
occurred in the same year for fish, by -1.882. Moreover, all other expenditure share 
variables did not even reach 1 or -1.  
 
Table 4: Parameter estimates for the restricted linear approximate AIDS model 
for meat demand in Egypt during the period 1990-2005 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variables   
Beef Chicken Mutton  Duck Fish  Rabbit 
            
Beef  0.187         
  (3.639**)         
Chicken  -0.054 0.052         
  (-3.981**) (3.427**)         
Mutton  -0.069 0.014  0.112       
  (-7.384**) (1.754)  (7.109**)       
Duck  -0.014 -0.001  -0.009  0.036     
  (-3.763**) (-0.287)  (-2.016)  (14.526**)     
Fish  -0.033 -0.007  -0.048  -0.013  0.112   
  (-0.6251) (-0.273)  (-4.898**) (-2.134*)  (1.604)   
Rabbit  -0.016 -0.003  0.001  0.001  -0.010  0.029 
  (-5.474**) (-1.104)  (0.366)  (0.691) (-1.931)   
Expenditures  -0.099 0.087  -0.078  -0.018  0.119  -0.011 
  (-2.581*) (5.3201**) (-12.751**) (-5.111**)  (2.562*)   
CONSTANT  1.769 -1.090  1.163  0.310  -1.350  0.198 
  (3.242*) (-4.560**) (12.858**)  (5.929**)  (-2.027)   
            
R
2  0.54 0.94  0.98  0.94  0.36   
DW  1.81 1.93  1.54  1.38  1.77   
EL  32.39 52.71  68.76  76.33  32.01  
SL  337.28         
AIC  312.28         
Note: t-ratio are in parentheses where *, and ** denote significant at 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
The t-ratio do not appear for coefficients which have been obtained using relevant restrictions. 
EL refers to equation log-likelihood, SL is the system log-likelihood, and AIC is the Akaike 





5.2. Empirical results of the model 
The model was estimated using the iterative Restricted Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (RSUR) procedures (Zellner, 1962) with Microfit version 4. The set of 
restrictions led to a singular variance/covariance matrix. Therefore, to avoid the 
singularity problem, one of the share equations was dropped from the system, the 
rabbit share equation, which represents the lowest expenditure share on average.  
The results of the RSUR system are shown in Table 4. The majority of the estimated 
equations contain a number of statistically significant coefficients, and overall the 
model fits the data well. The determination coefficients R
2s are 0.54, 0.94, 0.98, 0.94 
and 0.36 for beef, chicken, mutton, duck and fish respectively. The impacts of 
consumer expenditure on the demand share of chicken and fish meat are positive, but 
negative for all other meats. In addition, the expenditure impact is significant at level 
0.01, except for beef and fish which are significant at 0.05. We can therefore 
reasonably conclude that the parameter of expenditure reflects the impact of 
expenditure on budget share rather than quantity demanded. The detailed expenditure 
elasticities are presented in Table 5.  
The estimates of Marshallian own-price elasticities and expenditure elasticities are 
given in Table 5. The own-price elasticities are found to be negative, as expected, 
except for mutton. The reason for this unexpected sign may be religious practices, as 
most Muslims butcher sheep or goats for the Adha feast, i.e. the reason is a cultural 
rather than an economic one that would suppose the consumer is responding rationally 
to price changes. Regarding the other elasticities, fish showed the highest own-price 
elasticity, followed by chicken, beef and duck. 
Regarding the cross-price elasticities, beef showed a complementary relationship with 
the other meat types except with fish as the relation is substitutive. Chicken and fish 
showed a substitutive relationship with all other meat types. Duck showed a 
substitutive relationship with all meats except with rabbits. Mutton and rabbit showed 
a versatile relationship with the other meat types. The highest substitutive relationship 
was between mutton and beef.  
The calculated expenditure elasticities using equation 8 are positive except for 
mutton. This positive sign implies that meat of different types can be considered 
normal goods. The expenditure elasticities for chicken (1.65) and fish (1.35) are 
greater than one, which implies that they can be considered luxury goods. On the 
other hand, beef, duck and rabbit are less than one, which implies that they are 
necessary goods. It is important to mention that a high percentage of ducks and 
rabbits are home produced and consumed, especially in rural areas. Consequently, 




Table 5: Uncompensated (Marshallian) price and expenditure elasticities of Egyptian 
Meat, LA/AIDS Model (1990 -2005) 
 
  Beef Chicken  Mutton  Ducks  Fish  Rabbits 
Beef  -0.420  -0.432 -1.108  -0.335 -0.202  -0.189
Chicken  0.142  -0.704  0.258 -0.020 -0.320  0.118
Mutton  0.037 -0.089  0.886  -0.213 -0.797 0.045
Duck  0.116 -0.299  -0.028  -0.104 -1.038 0.052
Fish  -0.074 -0.086  -0.768  -0.319 -0.792  -0.089
Rabbit  0.975 -0.380  0.165  0.052 -1.253  -0.127
Expenditure  0.745 1.645  -0.254  0.547 1.348  0.660
Note: The bold values are the own-price elasticities, the others are the cross-price elasticities.  
 
The compensated own-price elasticity estimates in Table 6 show similar trends but 
smaller values than uncompensated ones, which is theoretically consistent. This result 
indicates that the income effect on the own quantities demanded of beef, chicken, 
mutton, duck, rabbit and fish is very significant for the purchaser.  
 
Table 6: Compensated (Hicksian) elasticities of Egyptian meat, LA/AIDS model (1990–
2005) 
  Beef Chicken  Mutton  Ducks  Fish  Rabbits 
Beef  -0.131  -0.014 -0.733  0.051 0.290  -1.568
Chicken  -0.005  -0.482  0.358 0.110 0.115  1.320
Mutton  -0.117 0.164  0.870  -0.163 -0.080 0.459
Duck  0.005 0.033  -0.107  -0.082 0.002 0.484
Fish  0.256 0.290  -0.441  0.021 -0.332  -0.590




The results show that the Marshallian own-price elasticity was the highest for fish, 
followed by chicken, beef, and duck. On the other hand, the cross-price elasticities of 
beef showed a complementary relationship with the other meat types, except with fish 
as the relationship is substitutive. Chicken and fish showed a substitutive relationship 
with all other meat types. Duck showed a substitutive relationship with all meat types 
except rabbit. Mutton and rabbit showed a versatile relationship with the other meat 
types. The highest substitutive relationship is between mutton and beef. Compensated 
own-price elasticity estimates show similar trends but smaller values than 
uncompensated ones, which is theoretically consistent. 
The calculated expenditure elasticities are positive except for mutton, which implies 
that meat of different types can be considered normal goods. The expenditure 
elasticities for chicken and fish show they are luxury goods. On the other hand, beef, 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between rural non-farm employment and household 
welfare using nationally representative data from Madagascar. It focuses on labor outcomes 
in the context of household livelihood strategies that include farm and non-farm income 
earning opportunities. It identifies distinct household livelihood strategies that can be ordered 
in welfare terms, and estimates multinomial logit models to assess the extent of the barriers 
to choosing dominant strategies. It finds that high-return non-farm activities provide an 
important pathway out of poverty, but that barriers such as lack of (a) education, (b) formal 
credit and (c) access to telecommunications restrict participation in such activities. Individual 
employment choice models and estimates of earnings functions provide supporting evidence 
of these barriers. Although the poverty reduction effects may be limited, low-return non-farm 
activities also play an important role as safety nets by providing opportunities for ex ante risk 
reduction and ex post coping with shocks.  
Keywords: non-farm; livelihood strategy; diversification; labor; welfare; Madagascar 
Cet article examine la relation entre l’emploi du secteur non agricole et le bien-être des 
ménages dans les zones rurales grâce aux données représentatives, à l’échelle nationale, de 
Madagascar. Il cible les revenus générés par le travail dans le cadre des stratégies de 
subsistance des ménages qui incluent les possibilités de gagner de l’argent des secteurs 
agricole et non agricole. Il identifie différentes stratégies de subsistance des ménages que 
l’on peut classer en termes de bien-être et examine des modèles logit multinomiaux pour 
évaluer l’étendue des barrières dans le choix des stratégies dominantes. L’étude montre que 
les activités du secteur non agricole générant des revenus élevés permettent de manière 
significative de se sortir de la pauvreté, mais que les barrières comme le manque 
d’éducation (a), de crédit officiel (b), et d’accès aux télécommunications (c) réduisent la 
participation à de telles activités. Les modèles de choix en matière d’emploi pour les 
personnes individuelles et les évaluations des fonctions génération de revenu mettent en 
lumière ces barrières. Bien que les effets réduction de pauvreté soient limités, les activités du 
secteur non agricole générant peu de revenus jouent également un rôle important, en tant 
que filets de sécurité, en permettant la réduction de risque ex-ante et l’absorption des chocs 
ex-post.  
Mots-clés : non agricole ; stratégie de subsistance ; diversification ; main-d’oeuvre ; bien-
être ; Madagascar 
 
                                                 





The rural non-farm sector is often seen an important pathway out of poverty (Lanjouw, 
2001). Indeed, an empirical regularity emerging from studies of the non-farm economy in 
developing countries is that there exists a positive relationship between non-farm activity and 
welfare on average (Barrett et al., 2001). In addition, non-farm employment has the potential 
to reduce inequality, absorb a growing rural labor force, slow rural-urban migration and 
contribute to the growth of national income (Lanjouw & Feder, 2001).  
The supply of labor to the non-farm sector in rural areas, however, is perhaps best 
understood in the context of households’ decision making based on livelihood strategies 
(Reardon, 1997). After all, ‘diversification is the norm’ (Barrett et al., 2001), especially 
among agricultural households, whose livelihoods are vulnerable to climatic uncertainties. 
For households facing substantial crop and price risks, and consequently agricultural income 
risks, there is a strong incentive to diversify their income sources. In principle, such 
diversification could be accomplished through land and financial asset diversification. But 
the absence of well-functioning land and capital markets in developing countries often means 
that these diversification strategies are not feasible. Consequently, many rural households 
find themselves pursuing second-best diversification strategies through the allocation of 
household labor (Bhaumik et al., 2006). In this setting, household labor supply and allocation 
decisions are not made simply on the basis of productivity calculations; rather, they involve 
weighing both productivity and risk factors (Barrett et al., 2008). 
Given the multitude of constraints faced by households and the heterogeneity of non-farm 
employment opportunities available to them, livelihood diversification strategies vary widely 
(Barrett et al., 2005). This heterogeneity can make generalizations problematic and is a 
reason for our general lack of knowledge about the rural non-farm economy (Haggblade et 
al., 2007). Nonetheless, some broad characterizations are helpful.  
One such characterization is based on the existence of both push and pull factors that 
influence the choices households make when it comes to non-farm employment. First, there 
is an incentive, or push, for households with weak non-labor asset endowments and who live 
in risky agricultural zones to allocate household labor to non-farm activities. Although 
households frequently do turn to the non-farm sector as an ex ante risk reduction strategy, 
distress diversification into low-return non-farm activities is also observed as an ex post 
reaction to low farm income (Von Braun, 1989; Haggblade, 2007). In this way, there are 
benefits to low-return non-farm activities that serve as a type of safety net that ‘helps to 
prevent poor [households] from falling into even greater destitution’ (Lanjouw, 2001). 
Second, such factors as earnings premia from high productivity or high income activities 
may attract, or pull, some household labor into non-farm employment (Dercon & Krishnan, 
1996; Barrett et al., 2001; Lanjouw & Feder, 2001; Reardon et al., 2001; Haggblade, 2007). 
These high-return non-farm jobs may serve as a genuine source of upward mobility 
(Lanjouw, 2001). 
Another characterization is based on the type of livelihood strategies adopted. Identifying 
distinct livelihood strategies built on labor allocations can be informative, especially if 
certain strategies are found to offer higher returns than others. For example, the co-existence 
of high- and low-return strategies is an indication that there are barriers to adopting the 




a simple revealed preference argument suggests that, where different asset allocation 
strategies yield different income distributions that can be ordered in welfare terms…, 
any household observed to have adopted a lower return strategy must have faced a 
constraint that limited its choice set relative to those of its neighbors. 
Indeed, the positive correlation commonly found between household income and non-farm 
participation is consistent with access to these high-return strategies being limited to a 
subpopulation of well-endowed households.
1 After all, it is those who begin poor who 
typically face difficulties raising the funds required for investment and overcoming other 
entry barriers to participating in the type of non-farm activities that might raise their 
standards of living (Dercon & Krishnan, 1996; Barrett et al., 2005; Bhaumik et al., 2006). 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between rural non-farm employment and 
household welfare using nationally representative data from Madagascar. In doing so, we 
focus attention on labor outcomes in the context of household livelihood strategies that 
include farm and non-farm income earning opportunities. We identify distinct household 
livelihood strategies that can be ordered in welfare terms and estimate multinomial logit 
models to assess the extent to which there exist barriers to choosing dominant strategies. 
Individual employment choice models, as well as estimates of earnings functions, provide 
supporting evidence of these barriers. 
A weakness in the extensive and growing literature on household income diversification 
strategies is that the empirical analyses have generally been confined to limited geographical 
areas (Dercon & Krishnan, 1996; Ellis, 1998; Barrett et al., 2001; Little et al., 2001; Brück, 
2004; Bhaumik et al., 2006; Barrett et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006). This paper aims to fill 
this gap and to complement the existing literature by using nationally representative 
household survey data to generalize the results more broadly. 
In the next section we describe the main data source and define basic terms used in the paper. 
Section 3 provides an overview of individual labor market outcomes in Madagascar and 
identifies household livelihood strategies. In Section 4 we estimate the determinants of the 
livelihood strategies identified in the previous section to test for the existence of barriers that 
may prevent households from adopting high-return strategies associated with non-farm 
employment. In Section 5, given that household strategy choices are limited by the 
characteristics of their members, we estimate the determinants of individual employment 
choice and individual earnings. Section 6 concludes with remarks and observations. 
 
2. Data and definitions 
This section describes the main data source and defines the terms ‘employment’, ‘rural’ and 
‘non-farm’ as used in this paper. 
                                                 
1 The effect of non-farm participation is thus ambiguous. On the one hand, entry barriers that limit the 
accessibility of those with limited asset endowments to high-return non-farm activities tend to result in more 
inequality. On the other hand, the ‘safety-net’ role of the non-farm sector tends to buoy these same households 





Our main source of information in this analysis is the 2005 Madagascar Enquête Prioritaire 
auprès des Ménages (EPM), a nationally representative integrated household survey of 
11,781 households, 5,922 of which are in rural areas. The data were collected by the Institut 
National de la Statistique (INSTAT) between September and December, 2005. The sample 
was selected through a multi-stage sampling technique in which the strata were defined by 
the region and milieu (rural, secondary urban centers and primary urban centers), and the 
primary sampling units were fokontany.
2 Each of the fokontany was selected systematically, 
with probability proportional to size and sampling weights defined by the inverse probability 
of selection to obtain accurate population estimates. 
The multi-purpose questionnaires included sections on education, health, housing, 
agriculture, household expenditure, assets, non-farm enterprises and employment. 
Employment and earnings information are available in the employment, non-farm enterprise 
and agriculture sections. For a measure of household well-being, in this analysis we use the 
estimated household-level consumption aggregate constructed by INSTAT.  
Definitions: Employment, rural and farm vs non-farm 
Although workforce participation is high in Madagascar, formal labor markets are thin in 
rural areas. Fewer than 6% of those involved in income generating activities are 
compensated in the form of wages or salaries (Stifel et al., 2007). Given the agricultural 
orientation of the economy and the importance of family-level production units, most rural 
workers in this country are self-employed. We therefore adopt for this analysis a broad 
definition of labor markets that includes self-employment. If a labor market is a place where 
labor services are bought and sold, then self-employed individuals are seen as 
simultaneously buying and selling their own labor services. 
Two concepts related to the term ‘rural non-farm’ need clarification. First, when we refer to 
‘rural’ income (or employment), we mean income earned by rural households. This 
definition allows for income to be earned anywhere, including urban areas (Barrett et al., 
2001).
3 Second, we follow Reardon et al. (2001) and Haggblade et al. (2007) in defining 
‘non-farm’ activities as any activities outside agriculture (own-farming and wage 
employment in agriculture). This definition requires further clarification of what is meant by 
‘agriculture’. As described by Reardon et al. (2001:396),  
…agriculture produces raw agrifood products with one of the production factors 
being natural resources (land, rivers/lakes/ocean, air); the process can involve 
‘growing’ (cropping, aquaculture, livestock husbandry, woodlot production) or 
‘gathering’ (hunting, fishing, forestry). 
Thus, in addition to cropping, agriculture includes livestock husbandry, fishing and forestry. 
Non-farm production therefore includes industry (e.g. mining, wood products, energy, food 
and beverages, textiles and leather and construction materials) and services (e.g. commerce, 
handicrafts, hotels and restaurants, transport, public works and private health). Note that 
                                                 
2 There are 17,433 fokontany (village-level administrative divisions) in Madagascar.  
3 The data do not provide enough information to distinguish whether employment is in urban areas, but 
questions are asked about distance to the place of work. In 2005, for example, only 18% of wage workers 




although agro-processing is closely linked to agriculture (e.g. by transforming raw 
agricultural products) it is classified as non-farm (Haggblade et al., 2007). 
Finally, wage earnings were measured in the survey by asking wage-employed individuals 
how much they earned in terms of cash and in-kind payments. Non-wage (family) farm 
earnings were measured by estimating household agricultural earnings as a residual (total 
household consumption less all non-agricultural earnings and transfers). Household 
agricultural earnings were then divided by the number of household members working on the 
family farm and deflated regionally to approximate individual non-wage agricultural 
earnings. We caution that an implicit assumption underlying the use of this approximation of 
agricultural earnings is that household net savings are zero.
4 
 
3. Characteristics of rural labor markets and household livelihood strategies 
In this section we examine the characteristics of rural labor markets in Madagascar from the 
perspective of individuals and then analyze these individual outcomes in the context of 
household livelihood strategies. 
Individual outcomes 
Rural labor markets in Madagascar are characterized predominantly by agricultural 
activities. Some 93% of economically active adults (aged 15 to 64) are employed in 
agriculture in one form or another, whether it is their primary or secondary job. Among 
primary jobs, 89% are agricultural (see Table 1), nearly all involving non-wage work on the 
family farm. Only 4% are wage positions.
5 Further, 71% of second jobs (held by 32% of all 
employed adults) are in agriculture. Unlike primary jobs, however, secondary jobs in 
agriculture are more likely to be wage positions (64%). 
 
 
Table 1: Employment among economically active adults (15–64) in rural Madagascar (2005) 
     Percent employed in…   
    Percent with  Farm   Non-farm   
      1st or 2nd job  Non-wage Wage Total     Non-wage  Wage  Total    
                  
1st job  100  85 4  89   5  6  11   
                  
Expenditure quintile               
 Poorest  100  90 4  95   3  3  5   
 Q2  100  87 5  91   5  4  9   
 Q3  100  89 4  93   4  4  7   
 Q4  100  85 3  88   6  7  12   
 Richest  100  75 3  77   10  12  23   
 
                  
                                                 
4 Another approach, to value agricultural production, was also taken but the unit prices used to value unsold 
production proved to be problematic. 
5 Employment in the questionnaire was defined as activities for which the individual received remuneration. 
This may explain the low percentage of agricultural wage labor, as reciprocal agricultural labor was not 
included. In the comprehensive agricultural module of the 2001 EPM survey, we find that reciprocal labor was 




Education level                 
 None  100  90 4  94   4  2  6   
 Primary  100  86 3  89   6  5  11   
 LowSecondary  100  71 4  75   11  14  25   
 UpperSecondary  100  53 3  56   11  34  44   
 PostSecondary  100  25 3  28   10  62  73   
                                
                  
2nd job  32  26 46  71   24  4  29   
                  
Expenditure quintile               
 Poorest  29  18 61  78   17  4  22   
 Q2  35  21 53  74   22  4  26   
 Q3  33  25 47  73   23  4  27   
 Q4  33  25 42  67   28  5  33   
 Richest  28  43 21  65   30  5  35   
                  
Education Level                 
 None  32  21 51  73   24  3  27   
 Primary  32  28 43  71   25  5  29   
 LowSecondary  29  37 30  67   24  9  33   
 UpperSecondary  36  50 17  67   23  9  33   
 PostSecondary  27  63 4  67   26  7  33   
                                
Source: Author's calculations from EPM 2005             
 
Nearly 20% of active adults are employed in some form of non-farm activity. Only 11% of 
first jobs are in the non-farm sector, whereas 29% of second jobs are non-agricultural (Table 
1). This finding is consistent with the notion that individuals are drawn to non-farm 
employment for their second jobs during periods of slack demand for agricultural labor. 
Unfortunately, this cannot be verified with the data at hand. 
As is commonly found in other African countries (Barrett et al., 2001), there is a positive 
relationship between rural non-farm employment and welfare as measured by per capita 
household expenditure.
6 The percentage of workers with non-farm employment rises by 
expenditure quintile, with 11% employed in the poorest quintile in this sector and 31% in the 
richest. Among primary employment activities, only 5% were non-farm for those in the 
poorest quintile, while nearly a quarter were non-farm for those in the richest (Table 1).  
As noted earlier, there may be substantial barriers to entry to high-return non-farm activities 
(Barrett et al., 2001). One such barrier may be lack of skills and education among the poor. 
As shown in Table 1, there is a strikingly strong positive relationship between educational 
attainment and non-farm activities among first jobs. For example, only 6% of those with no 
education are employed in the non-farm sector, compared to 44% of those with upper 
secondary education and 73% of those with post-secondary. The biggest differences are for 
wage activities, where 2% of those with no education had non-farm wage employment, 
compared to 34% of those with upper secondary education and 62% of those with post-
                                                 
6 Household expenditures are more accurately defined as consumption as they include not only expenditure 
items but also own-consumption of household agricultural and non-agricultural production as well as the 
imputed stream of benefits from durable goods and housing. The consumption aggregate for the EPM 2005 was 




secondary. The education–non-farm employment gradient is not as steep for secondary 
employment, probably because most non-farm employment among second jobs is in the 
form of non-wage (85%) rather than wage activities. 
The general attraction of non-farm wage employment suggested in Table 1 is further 
illustrated by the relatively high earnings in this sector (Table 2). With a median of 
Ar 78,000 per month (approximately US$37),
7 earnings for non-farm wage workers are more 
than double not only those in the farm sector (Ar 31,000 for non-wage and Ar 38,000 for 
wage), but also those in the non-farm non-wage sector (Ar 37,000). Interestingly, on the 
basis of earnings alone, non-farm non-wage employment is not unambiguously preferred to 
farm activities since there is no clear pattern showing which sector has the higher earnings. 
As is characteristic of non-farm sectors throughout the developing world, and as will become 
clearer in this paper, non-farm employment activities in Madagascar are highly 
heterogeneous (Haggblade et al., 2007). 
 
Table 2: Median monthly earnings of adults (15–64) in rural Madagascar (2005) 
Thousands of ariary  Farm   Non-farm   
      Non-wage Wage  Total     Non-wage  Wage  Total    
1st job  31 38  31   37  78  67   
Expenditure quintile               
 Poorest  17  36  18   25  48  28   
 Q2  26  38  27   21  66  41   
 Q3  31  38  32   32  69  47   
 Q4  39  42  39   37  78  63   
 Richest  58  44  58   67  100  89   
Education level               
 None  29  37  30   28  49  36   
 Primary  33  42  33   26  72  48   
 LowSecondary  41  37  40   70  89  84   
 UpperSecondary  45  29  45   75  100  91   
 PostSecondary  38  *173  45   195  150  151   
                             
2nd job  24 20  21   22  39  24   
Expenditure quintile               
 Poorest  12  17  17   16  29  18   
 Q2  17  22  20   20  39  21   
 Q3  23  22  22   23  39  24   
 Q4  29  18  20   21  37  22   
 Richest  37  30  35   32  57  35   
Education level               
 None  23  19  20   21  30  21   
 Primary  22  22  22   22  35  24   
 LowSecondary  27  25  26   31  58  37   
 UpperSecondary  29  *30  30   24  *57  37   
 PostSecondary  *28  *40  *28   *73  *57  60   
                             
Source: Author's calculations from EPM 2005 
Note: 1 USD = approx. 2,100 MGA in 2005.            
* Fewer than 20 observations             
 
                                                 




The evidence in Table 2 suggests that, in general, individuals may be pressed into non-farm 
non-wage employment as part of household income diversification strategies designed to 
reduce risk. Since it is not clear that earnings alone are enough to attract individuals to this 
sector, push factors such as land constraints, risky farming and weak or incomplete financial 
systems may instead be the forces compelling households to diversify their income sources 
by allocating household labor to non-farm non-wage employment. Conversely, pull factors 
such as higher earnings appear to be attracting labor to the non-farm wage. 
Push factors may also motivate individuals to take on second jobs, particularly those in 
farming and in non-farm non-wage activities where median earnings are roughly two thirds 
those of first jobs. Although earnings for second jobs in the non-farm wage sector are 
approximately half those for first jobs (Ar  39,000 compared to Ar 78,000),  they  remain 
attractive relative to all other earnings, whether for first or second jobs. 
Monthly farm wage earnings for first jobs are surprisingly high compared to family farm 
earnings (a median of Ar 38,000 compared to Ar 31,000). There are two possible reasons for 
this. One may be measurement issues because of the small size of the sample (only 4% of 
economically active adults) or differences in the definitions of wage and non-wage earnings, 
and the other may be the seasonal nature of agricultural wage employment. Indeed, median 
monthly earnings for seasonally wage employed individuals in agriculture are higher than for 
those with permanent employment (Ar 42,000 compared to Ar 31,000), and among wage 
employed individuals with permanent jobs, median earnings are similar to those of family 
farm workers. 
Household outcomes 
As noted above, in the presence of weak land and financial markets, household non-farm 
labor supply decisions are made by weighing both productivity and risk factors in the context 
of household livelihood strategies. Nonetheless, not all activities are available to all 
households. Diversification strategies may be affected by the constraints that exist for many 
activities. As Dercon and Krishnan (1996) note, ‘the ability to take up particular activities 
will distinguish the better off household from the household that is merely getting by’. In this 
section we therefore explore household patterns of labor diversification and identify 
strategies that can be ordered in welfare terms. 
Given that households typically have more than one economically active member, we find 
that household income sources are more diversified than individual income sources (Table 
3). While the percentage of households with at least one member employed in agriculture is 
the same as the percentage of individuals employed in agriculture (93%), households are 
more likely than individuals to also derive labor income from non-farm sources. For 
example, whereas 20% of economically active individuals in rural areas have some sort of 
non-farm employment, 31% of households in rural areas have at least one member in non-





Table 3: Household employment activities* in rural Madagascar (2005) 
Percent  Farm   Non-farm   
      Non-wage Wage  Total     Non-wage  Wage  Total    
                
Total 92  24  93   22  13  31   
                 
Expenditure quintile               
 Poorest  94  28  96   15  8  22   
 Q2  94  29  95   22  10  29   
 Q3  96  26  97   23  10  31   
 Q4  92  21  93   25  16  37   
 Richest  81  12  82   26  21  41   
                             
Source: Author's calculations from EPM 2005            
* Percent of households with at least one member employed in the various categories   
 
This pattern is seen consistently across the household expenditure distribution. While only 
11% of individuals in the poorest quintile have non-farm employment, 22% of households 
have non-farm employment. Similarly, 31% of economically active individuals in the richest 
quintile have non-farm jobs compared to 41% of households. 
The rural non-farm economy is also a relatively important source of household income 
(Table 4). On average, households derive 22% of their income from non-farm jobs, whereas 
for individuals it is 20%. Conversely, although 93% of economically active adults derive at 
least some of their income from agriculture, only 78% of household income comes from this 
source. 
 
Table 4: Sources of income by sector of activity in rural Madagascar (2005) 
Share of total labor income          
     Non-farm      
      Farm  Total  Industry Services     Total     
              
2005  78 22  3 19   100   
              
 Poorest  85  15  3 12   100   
 Q2  82  18  2 16   100   
 Q3  82  18  4 15   100   
  Q4  79 21  2 19   100   
 Richest  68  32  4 28   100   
                          
Source: Author's calculations from EPM 2005          
 
As with employment, there is a strong positive relationship between non-farm income shares 
and welfare. Those in the poorest quintile derive 15% of their income from non-farm 
employment, whereas households in the richest quintile derive more than twice this much 




richer sector, the non-farm economy may lead to greater income inequality (Lanjouw & 
Feder, 2001). 
Livelihood strategies 
Is there a way that we can broadly define households in rural Madagascar so as to distinguish 
them by their livelihood strategies and provide insights into the choices available to them? If 
so, what distinct livelihood strategies do households adopt and can they be ordered in 
welfare terms? Identifying livelihood strategies in an informative manner is not 
straightforward, since a precise operational definition of ‘livelihood’ remains elusive. 
Consequently, methods of identifying livelihoods have been varied (Brown et al., 2006).
8 
The approach adopted here is a simple one, but it effectively delineates households into 
categories that facilitate welfare orderings. 
To determine these strategies, we begin by categorizing households according to 
permutations of choices among farm and non-farm and wage and non-wage activities. As 
Table 5 shows, there are three broad categories – farm activities only, non-farm activities 
only and combinations of farm and non-farm activities. The distribution of these strategies 
among the rural population is as follows: 67% live in households that allocate all their labor 
to agricultural activities, 27% have some members who work in agriculture and some who 
work off-farm,
9 and only 5% rely solely on non-farm activities for income.
10  
                                                 
8 A common method is to group households by income shares (e.g. Dercon & Krishnan, 1996; Barrett et al., 
2005). Brown et al. (2006) used cluster analysis to identify livelihood strategies in the rural Kenyan highlands, 
but while this approach is intuitively appealing, a similar exercise carried out with the EPM data resulted in 
strategies for which no stochastic dominance orderings could be established. 
9 This is consistent with Haggblade’s (2007) observation that ‘most rural non-farm activities are undertaken by 
diversified households that operate farm and non-farm enterprises simultaneously’. 
10 We ignore those households whose sole source of income is non-labor income since these are made up 





Table 5: Household livelihood strategies in rural Madagascar (2005) 
   Percent pursuing each strategy      
   Expenditure  quintile      Poverty 
        Poorest Q2 Q3 Q4  Richest Total      Headcount  Depth 
                  
Livelihood strategies               
                  
Only  farm  77 71 66 64  55  67    78  31 
  Family & wage farm  22  25  19  19  9  19    85  34 
  Wage  farm  only  1 1 1 0  0  1    83 42 
  Family  farm  only  53 45 47 46  46  47    75  30 
                 
Farm  &  non-farm  20 25 30 30  29  27    70  25 
  Family & wage farm and non-farm  3  4  5  3  3  4    79  30 
  Wage  farm  and  non-farm  1 1 0 1  1  1    71 30 
  Family farm and non-farm  16  19  25  26  25  22    69  25 
  -  Non-wage  non-farm  11 14 16 16  15  14    71  26 
  -  Non-wage  &  wage  non-farm  1 2 1 2  1  1    69 23 
  -  Wage  non-farm  4 4 8 8  8  6    63 22 
                 
Only  non-farm  2 3 2 4  13  5    39 15 
  Non-wage  &  wage  non-farm  0 1 1 1  3  1    38 12 
  Non-wage  non-farm  1 1 1 1  3  1    46 18 
  Wage  non-farm  1 1 1 2  6  2    37 14 
                 
Non-labor  income  2 2 1 1  3  2    57 24 
                 
Total  100 100 100 100  100  100    73 29 
                                
Source: Author's calculations from EPM 2005            
 
 
Although there is some overlap within these three categories, there is also a clear overall 
welfare ordering. Poverty rates are highest among households that rely exclusively on 
farming (78%) and lowest among those that rely solely on non-farm activities (39%). 
Although the poverty rate for households that adopt both farm and non-farm activities is 
lower than the rural poverty rate, it is still high at 70%. 
What is most striking is that despite seemingly high agricultural wage earnings (Table 2), 
households with members involved in agricultural wage activities tend to be the among the 
poorest. For example, households that combine family farming with wage farming have the 
highest poverty rates (85%) and are concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution 
(e.g. 22% of the poorest expenditure quintile compared to 9% of the richest quintile). 
Further, of the 1% living in households that rely solely on agricultural wage labor, 83% are 
poor. Indeed these households are poorer than any other group as measured by the depth of 
poverty.
11 This suggests that households may be resorting to agricultural wage activities as 
an ex post reaction to low farm income or because of various ex ante push factors. For this 
analysis we therefore define a distinct livelihood strategy in which households resort to 
                                                 




agricultural wage activities (‘any agricultural wage’ or AW). This category of households 
includes those with family farm or non-farm activities, or both, as long as at least one 
member of the household worked for a wage in agriculture. Nearly a quarter of the rural 
population lives in a household in this category, and 83% of them are poor. 
The other three distinct strategies follow naturally from Table 6 and are illustrated along with 
AW in this table. The first identifies households that rely solely on family farming (FF). 
These account for 47% of the rural population, 75% of whom are poor. The second identifies 
the 22% of the rural population who live in households with members involved in both 
family farm and non-farm activities (FFNF). As Table 5 shows, these households’ non-farm 
activities are primarily non-wage family enterprises (72%). The poverty rate for this group is 
even lower at 69%. Finally, the third identifies 5% of the rural population, 39% of whom are 
poor and live in households whose income is solely from non-farm activities (NF). Unlike 
the FFNF households, those living in NF households are predominantly in wage employment 
(73%). 
 
Table 6: Aggregated household livelihood strategies in rural Madagascar (2005) 
   Percent pursuing each strategy      
   Expenditure  quintile     Poverty 
      Poorest  Q2  Q3  Q4  Richest  Total     Headcount  Depth 
                  
Livelihood strategies                
                  
Any  farm  wage  27 31 24 23  13  24    83  33 
Family farm only  53  45  47  46  46  47    75  30 
Family farm & non-farm  16  19  25  26  25  22    69  25 
Non-farm  only  2 3 2 4  13  5    39  15 
                  
Non-labor  income  2 2 1 1  3  2    57  24 
                  
Total  100 100 100 100  100  100    73  29 
                                
Source: Author's calculations from EPM 2005           
 
Besides being chosen by differing poverty levels, these strategies also differ in the returns 
they offer across nearly the entire distribution of income. This suggests a clear welfare 
ordering in that some strategies are superior to others because they bring in more income. 
Appealing to dominance analysis as a way of testing for the existence of such superior 
strategies (Brown et al., 2006), in Figure 1 we plot the cumulative frequencies of per capita 
household consumption for each of the four household types. The idea is that dominance 
tests permit us to make ordinal judgments about livelihood strategies on the basis of the 
entire distribution of household well-being, not just particular points (such as the poverty 
line). Specifically, pairs of livelihood-specific distributions are compared over a range of 
consumption values. One distribution is said to first-order dominate the other if and only if 
the cumulative frequency is lower than the other for every possible consumption level in the 
range (Ravallion, 1994). The implication of this lower distribution is that there is a greater 
likelihood that households adopting this strategy will have higher consumption levels. 






Figure 1: Cumulative frequency of household consumption by livelihood strategy 
 
Figure 1 shows that at very low levels of consumption there is no clear ordering of 
strategies.
12 However, for the 91% of households with per capita consumption levels of 
Ar 120,000 and above, NF first-order dominates the other three strategies.
13 In other words, 
on the basis of this criterion, NF is a superior strategy. Similarly, the FFNF strategy 
dominates FF up to a value of Ar  375,000. Further, since FF dominates AW for all 
consumption values above Ar  150,000 (these two distributions are indistinguishable for 
values below this), AW is inferior to the other three strategies. Thus, strategies that include 
some non-farm employment are superior to those that rely solely on farming or some form of 
farm wage employment. 
 
4. Analysis of rural household livelihood strategies 
Barrett et al. (2001:316) observe that ‘The positive wealth-non-farm correlation may also 
suggest that those who begin poor in land and capital face an uphill battle to overcome entry 
                                                 
12 This follows partly because there are so few households at the lower tails. Note further that because the 
distributions cross multiple times at the lower tails, tests of second and third order dominance also prove 
inconclusive in terms of ordering the distributions. These tests place more weight on differences at the lower 
end of the distribution than the test of first order dominance does. 
13 We also statistically test the vertical difference between the NF distribution and each of the other 
distributions (Davidson & Duclos, 2000; Sahn & Stifel, 2002). For 100 test points between Ar 120,000 and 
Ar 400,000, the null hypothesis that the difference in the cumulative frequencies is zero was rejected. We thus 




barriers and steep investment requirements to participation in non-farm activities capable of 
lifting them from poverty’. 
The evidence from Section 3 above indicates that there are superior household livelihood 
strategies associated with non-farm employment. This naturally makes us ask why so few 
rural households choose the dominant strategies (5% for NF and 22% for FFNF). The next 
question is whether there are barriers that prevent households from adopting these strategies. 
To address this, we analyze rural household livelihood strategy choice using multinomial 
logit models. The choices, ordered from inferior to superior, are those described above: (a) 
any agricultural wage (AW), (b) family farming only (FF), (c) family farm and non-farm 
activities (FFNF) and (d) non-farm activities only (NF). The estimated effects in these 
models should not be interpreted literally as determinants of choices for two reasons. First, 
unobserved household characteristics such as motivation and entrepreneurship may be 
correlated with both the observed characteristics (access to credit, ownership of durable 
goods, etc.) and the chosen livelihood strategy. In such cases, the endogeneity bias of the 
parameter estimates cannot be ruled out. Second, since not all the choices will necessarily be 
available to each household, the parameters should be interpreted as reduced form estimates 
of how household and community characteristics affect the probabilities that households are 
able to choose one of the four livelihood strategies. The household and community 
covariates used in the estimates are summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Summary statistics for models of household livelihood strategy choice in rural areas 
Sample: All households with labor income       Family farm    Family farm          
              in rural areas  Any agric. wage    only    and non-farm    Non-farm only   
      mean  std dev     mean  std dev     mean  std dev     mean  std dev    
                       
Age  of  household  head  41.6  12.0   43.5  13.0   43.3  11.2   40.9  11.7  
Female household head (dummy)  0.136  0.343    0.125  0.331   0.129  0.335   0.230  0.421  
Migrant (dummy)  0.084  0.278    0.067  0.250   0.092  0.289   0.195  0.397  
Household structure                      
  Household size (number of members)  6.289  2.476   6.014  2.499   6.423  2.536   4.806  1.813  
  Share of children < 5  0.166  0.152    0.135  0.150   0.157  0.152   0.118  0.145  
  Share of children 5–14  0.327  0.194    0.332  0.201   0.323  0.192   0.306  0.216  
  Share of men 15–64
†  0.239  0.151   0.255  0.157   0.243  0.152   0.260  0.194  
  Share of women 15–64  0.252  0.129    0.257  0.137   0.268  0.139   0.306  0.172  
  Share of members 65+  0.015  0.061    0.020  0.075   0.010  0.045   0.010  0.058  
Education dummies – most educated member                    
 Primary  0.558  0.497    0.498  0.500   0.459  0.499   0.272  0.445  
 Lower  secondary  0.075  0.263    0.106  0.308   0.180  0.384   0.249  0.433  
 Upper  secondary  0.032  0.176    0.040  0.196   0.089  0.284   0.189  0.392  
 Post  secondary  0.007  0.081    0.008  0.086   0.037  0.189   0.170  0.376  
                       
Radio (dummy – HH owns one)  0.479  0.500    0.509  0.500   0.663  0.473   0.664  0.473  
                       
Non-labor income (log)  2.64  4.47    2.02  4.23   2.53  4.50   3.37  5.19  
Value of agricultural assets (log)  2.14  1.40   2.53  1.80   2.52  1.57   0.57  1.16  
Land holding dummies                      
 None  0.046  0.210    0.016  0.124   0.031  0.173   0.828  0.377  
  < 1 hectare
†  0.530  0.499   0.238  0.426   0.350  0.477   0.069  0.254  
 1–3  hectares  0.318  0.466    0.502  0.500   0.441  0.497   0.081  0.273  




   5–10 hectares  0.021  0.142    0.057  0.231   0.045  0.208   0.008  0.091  
 10+  hectares  0.012  0.110    0.048  0.214   0.037  0.190   0.006  0.080  
Difficult access to formal credit (dummy)  0.54  0.50   0.52  0.50   0.46  0.50   0.50  0.50  
                       
Community characteristics                      
  MFI available in community  0.518  0.500    0.424  0.494   0.431  0.495   0.468  0.500  
  Phone (dummy at least one HH owns)  0.018  0.132   0.031  0.172   0.082  0.275   0.440  0.497  
 Electricity  access  (dummy)  0.072  0.258   0.083  0.275   0.076  0.266   0.541  0.499  
  Piped water access (dummy)  0.508  0.500   0.406  0.491   0.473  0.499   0.615  0.487  
Distance to nearest city (dummies)                      
  <2 hours  0.051  0.220    0.053  0.224   0.091  0.287   0.351  0.478  
 2–5  hours  0.226  0.419    0.214  0.410   0.225  0.418   0.228  0.420  
 5–10  hours
†  0.355  0.479   0.174  0.379   0.174  0.379   0.097  0.296  
 10–15  hours  0.095  0.293    0.104  0.306   0.099  0.299   0.082  0.274  
 15–24  hours  0.101  0.301    0.074  0.262   0.088  0.283   0.051  0.220  
 24+  hours  0.173  0.378    0.380  0.486   0.323  0.468   0.192  0.394  
                       
Percent with labor income in each category  24      48      23      5     
Sample size  1,085        3,065        1,143        366       
Source: Data from EPM 2005                         
† Left out category in the estimates                         
 
 
The estimated marginal effects that appear in Table 8 are interpreted as the average change 
in the probability of a household selecting a particular livelihood strategy corresponding to a 
one unit change in the independent variables. Because the average marginal effects are 
shown instead of the estimated coefficients, all four livelihood strategies (including the left-
out category) can be shown. The marginal effects sum to zero across the categories.
14 
 
Table 8: Regression analysis of household livelihood strategy choice in rural areas 
Multinomial logit                      
Sample: All households with labor income  in 
rural areas  Any agric. wage    Family farm only   
Family farm and 
non-farm  Non-farm  only   
     
Marg 
effect t-val     
Marg 
effect t-val     
Marg 
effect t-val     
Marg 
effect t-val     
Age of household head  -0.001  -3.06 
***  0.000 0.79 
  0.001 1.52 
  0.000 0.93 
 
Female household head (dummy)  0.01  0.40 
  -0.04 -2.32 
**  0.02 1.28 
  0.01 2.10 
** 
Migrant (dummy)  0.02  1.16 
  -0.06 -3.17 
***  0.04 2.03 
**  0.01 1.18 
 
Household structure
†    
    
    
    
 
  Household size (number of members)  0.012  4.67 
***  -0.013 -4.08 
***  0.006 2.02 
**  -0.005 -3.30 
*** 
  Share of children < 5  0.00  -0.03 
  0.00 -0.06 
  0.00 0.10 
  0.00 0.00 
 
  Share of children 5–14  0.00 -0.02 
  0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.01 
  0.00 0.04 
 
  Share of women 15–64  0.00 -0.05 
  0.00 -0.05 
  0.00 0.10 
  0.00 -0.01 
 
  Share of members 65+  0.01  0.08 
  0.01 0.10 
  -0.02 -0.16 
  0.00 0.05 
 
Education dummies - most educated member  
    
    
    
 
 Primary  0.01  0.57 
  -0.04 -3.33 
***  0.03 2.63 
***  0.00 0.77 
 
 Lower  secondary  -0.07  -4.77 
***  -0.12 -5.71 
***  0.14 6.03 
***  0.05 4.58 
*** 
 Upper  secondary  -0.06  -2.96 
***  -0.21 -7.33 
***  0.20 6.17 
***  0.07 4.19 
*** 
 Post  secondary  -0.10  -3.89 
***  -0.33 -7.71 
***  0.34 6.58 
***  0.09 3.64 
*** 
                                                 
14 The left-out category in the estimation is FF. Note that the sample does not include those households without 




            
    
Radio (dummy - HH owns one)  -0.03  -3.14 
***  -0.04 -3.41 
***  0.06 5.25 
***  0.01 1.70 
* 
            
    
Non-labor income (log)  0.00  0.03 
  0.00 -0.02 
  0.00 -0.01 
  0.00 0.03 
 
Value of agricultural assets (log)  0.00  0.09 
  0.00 0.43 
  0.00 0.32 
  0.00 -1.96 
** 
Land holding dummies
††    
    
    
    
 
 None  0.07  2.75 
***  -0.29 -9.63 
***  -0.12 -6.49 
***  0.33 7.32 
*** 
 1–3  hectares  -0.06 -6.60 
***  0.08 5.79 
***  -0.02 -1.53 
  0.00 0.08 
 
 3–5  hectares  -0.07  -5.28 
***  0.14 6.79 
***  -0.05 -3.22 
***  -0.01 -0.91 
 
 5–10  hectares  -0.09  -4.50 
***  0.13 4.64 
***  -0.06 -2.64 
***  0.01 0.91 
 
 10+  hectares  -0.07  -3.32 
***  0.07 2.45 
**  0.00 -0.16 
  0.01 0.33 
 
Difficult access to formal credit (dummy)  0.04  3.72 
***  -0.01 -1.11 
  -0.02 -1.99 
**  0.00 -0.82 
 
            
    
Community characteristics    
    
    
    
 
  MFI available in community  -0.03  -2.42 
**  0.06 3.73 
***  -0.02 -1.19 
  -0.01 -2.75 
*** 
  Phone (dummy at least one HH owns)  0.00  -0.11 
  -0.11 -3.91 
***  0.09 3.17 
***  0.03 2.62 
*** 
 Electricity  access  (dummy)  -0.02  -1.23 
  0.06 2.84 
***  -0.06 -3.21 
***  0.01 1.70 
* 
 Piped  water  access  (dummy) 0.01  1.39 
  -0.03 -2.60 
***  0.01 0.87 
  0.01 1.82 
* 
Distance to nearest city (dummies)
†††    
    
    
    
 
  < 2 hours  0.02  0.69 
  -0.05 -1.74 
*  0.04 1.41 
  0.00 -0.42 
 
 2–5  hours  -0.01  -1.00 
  0.05 2.63 
***  -0.04 -2.36 
**  0.00 0.26 
 
 10–15  hours  0.01  0.70 
  -0.06 -2.64 
***  0.05 2.16 
**  0.00 0.00 
 
 15–24  hours  0.07  2.80 
***  -0.10 -3.82 
***  0.05 1.82 
*  -0.01 -1.62 
 
 24+  hours  -0.03  -1.88 
*  0.00 -0.24 
  0.05 2.49 




                      
Percent with labor income in each category  24      48      23      5     
Percent correctly predicted                    63     
Number of observations                    5,659     
Pseudo R-squared                             0.31       
Source: Data from EPM 2005                         
Note: Region dummies included but not shown. Left out strategy in estimation is ‘Family farm only’. 
Note: Marginal effects show the average change in the probability of chosen strategy resulting from a unit change in the independent 
variable. Consequently the marginal effects sum to zero across the categories.     
† Left out category is share of men 15-64; 
†† Left out category is < 1 hectare; 
††† Left out category is 5–10 hours. 
 
Three potential barriers to participation in high-return non-farm activities by households are 
highlighted in the model estimates. First, households with higher levels of educational 
attainment tend to be those who choose the dominant NF and FFNF strategies. The measure 
of household education used here is the education level of the most educated member of the 
household.
15 Households in which the most educated member attained a lower (upper) 
secondary level of education are 14% (20%) more likely to adopt a FFNF strategy than those 
with no education at all. Households with less education are most likely to adopt the least 
remunerative AW and FF strategies. Given the positive relationship between household 
welfare and education in Madagascar (Amendola & Vecchi, 2007), poor households with 
                                                 
15 In doing so, we assume that there are household public good characteristics to education. Basu and Foster 
(1998) suggest that literacy may have public good characteristics in the household and formalize an ‘effective’ 
literacy rate based on this aspect of education (See also Valenti, 2001; Basu et al., 2002). Sarr (2004) finds 
evidence from Senegal that illiterate members of households benefit from the earnings of literate members. 
Almeyda-Duran (2005) also finds that in some situations there are child health benefits to village level 




low levels of education generally face greater barriers than the non-poor in their choices of 
high-return livelihood strategies. 
Second, households without access to formal credit
16 tend to adopt inferior AW strategies 
and are less likely to combine family farming with non-farm activities. For those households 
adopting AW strategies, credit market failures may be a barrier to adopting any of the 
higher-return livelihood strategies. For the FFNF, some households may indeed engage in 
non-farm activities because they have access to credit, as the model estimates suggest. But 
given the measure of credit access used in this model, the result is also consistent with the 
notion that farm households may engage in non-farm activities as a means of generating cash 
to substitute for the absence or high cost of credit. The idea is that they do this in order to 
purchase agricultural inputs or to make farm investments (Ellis, 1998). In the measure of 
access used here, households that are not classified as ‘having difficulty accessing formal 
credit’ in the EPM data include those that report not seeking credit because they either (a) 
did not need it (9%) or (b) did not want to have any debt (33%). Indeed, the source of start-
up financing for household non-farm enterprises is predominantly household saving (78%). 
It may be households such as these that rely on non-farm activities to accumulate cash 
savings as a substitute for the absence of credit markets.
17 
In an effort to address the potential endogeneity of the household-specific credit access 
measure and to measure an independent effect of credit availability, a community-level 
variable is included in the model to indicate the presence of a microfinance institution 
(MFI).
18 As expected, the presence of an MFI is associated with lower probabilities of 
households adopting AW strategies. However, it is also associated with a 1% decrease in the 
probability of adopting the preferred NF strategy. Indeed, households living in communities 
with MFIs present are 6% more likely to adopt FF strategies. This result is consistent with 
non-farm activities substituting for the absence of credit markets. However, it may also be 
because MFIs target poorer communities (Zeller et al., 2003). Such targeting can lead to 
biased estimates of the effect of MFI availability on livelihood choice (Pitt et al., 1993). 
Third, households with access to forms of outside communication have a greater likelihood 
of choosing the dominant livelihood strategies. For example, households owning a radio are 
6% more likely to have members undertaking a preferred strategy of participating in both 
family farming and non-farm activities. Similarly, those that live in villages in which at least 
one household has a phone are 11% more likely to have members involved in non-farm 
activities. Admittedly, owning a radio could be a consequence of higher earnings associated 
with the dominant strategy.
19 We therefore proceed with caution with regard to radio access, 
and emphasize the effect of village access to telecommunications as measured by at least one 
household owning a phone.
20 This form of communication represents access to information 
                                                 
16 Households are categorized as such when they have sought loans from formal institutions (banks or 
microfinance institutions) and were turned down, or if they report not applying for loans because (a) procedures 
are too complicated, (b) interest rates are too high, (c) they do not know the procedures, (d) they do not have 
collateral, or (e) they do not know of a lending institution. 
17 Although their livelihood strategies differ slightly from those identified here, Brown et al. (2006) similarly 
found that liquidity constraints appear to hamper the ability of households in the rural Kenyan highlands to 
diversify into high-return activities. 
18 The presence of a formal sector bank has no effect. 
19 Radio ownership has been used as a proxy for household welfare either as an asset (Sahn & Stifel, 2000) or 
as a predictor of household consumption (Stifel & Christiaensen, 2007).  
20 The model was also estimated using various measures of community radio access in an effort to address the 




about price and market conditions outside the community. Households living in communities 
without such access are more likely to allocate labor to farming activities geared toward 
home consumption and the local market – i.e. those activities that are likely to have lower 
remunerative rewards.
21 
Turning to other correlates of household livelihood strategy choice, it is interesting to note 
that although households living in rural communities with electrification are slightly more 
likely to adopt the dominant NF strategies (1%) they are even more likely to concentrate 
solely on family farming (6%). Households living in such communities are less likely to 
adopt the second best strategy of mixed family farming and non-farm activities (6%). 
Despite the mixed results, one lesson to be learned from the data is that although households 
adopting NF strategies tend to be situated in communities with electricity access (e.g. 54% of 
NF households have electricity compared to 9% for all other households; see Table 7), such 
access is not a sufficient condition for participation in non-farm employment activities. This 
may be due to endogenous placement of electrification or the bundling of electrification with 
other infrastructure variables, or both. 
Remoteness may affect the choice set of livelihood strategies available to households by 
affecting transaction costs and by determining the degree of access to markets and to market 
information. This is consistent with the multinomial logit model estimates where travel time 
to the nearest city serves as a proxy for remoteness and transaction costs. With increased 
travel times, households are less likely to rely on family farming alone and more likely to 
combine family farming activities with non-farm activities. For example, households that 
live 15 to 24 hours away from a major city are 10% less likely to adopt FF strategies and 5% 
more likely to adopt FFNF strategies. This is consistent with the notion that agricultural 
surplus can more easily be marketed to urban areas in less remote areas, while competition in 
the non-farm sector is greater in the vicinity of urban areas (Lanjouw & Feder, 2001). 
Finally, households living more than 15 hours away from the nearest city are 1 to 2% less 
likely to undertake wage-dominated NF strategies. 
Access to land has differential effects on household strategy choice. This being the case, 
these estimates neither confirm nor refute the claim that those poor in land holdings face 
entry barriers. For example, while households with more land are less likely to adopt AW 
strategies, they are more likely to concentrate their household labor solely in family farming. 
This is not surprising since land is an important agricultural input for farming households.
22 
Not only are landless households 7% more likely to adopt AW strategies that are inferior to 
those of smallholder households (less than one hectare), they are also 33% more likely than 
any landed households to adopt superior NF strategies. Whether inferior AW strategies or 
superior NF strategies are chosen by landless households probably depends on other 
characteristics that enable them to overcome the barriers to participation in non-farm 
activities.
23 
                                                                                                                                                       
of villages fall into this category, little effect was found. Similarly, no effect was found when using a variable 
indicating the share of households in the community with radios.  
21 This is consistent with Randrianarisoa et al.’s (2009) finding using 2001 data, that demand for hired non-farm 
labor in rural Madagascar is stimulated by similar access to information. 
22 Similarly, households with more non-land agricultural assets are also less likely to concentrate all of their 
labor efforts in non-farm activities. 
23 These estimates may also suffer from endogeneity bias as lack of land ownership may be correlated with 
unobserved household characteristics that are themselves correlated with advantages available to those working 




The relationship between land holdings and the choice of the FFNF strategy is nonlinear. 
Households that are more likely to adopt this strategy are either those with small land 
holdings (less than three hectares) or large land holdings (ten or more hectares). Those with 
medium-sized land holdings (three to five hectares) are 5 to 6% less likely to combine family 
farming with non-farm employment. This may follow from household labor constraints on 
the farm, since more land requires more household labor input. Although large holders are 
also affected by these constraints, they are also more likely to be wealthier and more capable 
of hiring labor. Such households are in a better position to invest in the human capital of 
their family members and to diversify into non-farm activities. 
 
5. Analysis of rural employment and labor earnings 
Since the ability of households to diversify their income sources depends to a large extent on 
the characteristics of their economically active members, we now use regression analysis to 
address rural employment patterns and earnings. This permits us to tackle the question of 
how barriers to participation in non-farm activities are associated with individual as well as 
household characteristics. We also assess the characteristics associated with earnings, once 
employment choices are made, by estimating earnings functions. In this context, we are able 
to further disaggregate the non-farm sector further into non-wage and wage activities 
(Malchow-Møller & Svarer, 2005). 
Rural employment 
We start with multinomial logit choice models similar to those in the previous section. In this 
case, however, instead of households the sample is made up of all 13,339 economically 
active individuals living in rural areas. Their employment is characterized as (a) agricultural 
wage, (b) family farming, (c) non-farm non-wage or (d) non-farm wage. Although there is 
considerable overlap in the distribution of earnings among these four employment types, 
they are roughly ordered in welfare terms (lowest annual earnings to highest on average). 
Separate models are estimated for primary and secondary employment, though only the 
former are presented here (Table 9).
24  
 
Table 9: Regression analysis of primary employment in rural areas 
Multinomial logit                      
 Sample: First jobs held by              Agric. wage    Family farm   
Nonfarm non-
wage   Nonfarm  wage   
     
 adults (15+) in rural areas Marg   
effect t-val     
Marg 
effect t-val     
Marg  
effect t-val     
Marg 
effect t-val     
Individual characteristics                     
 Female  (dummy)  -0.01  -1.23 
  -0.01 -1.54 
  0.03 4.15 
***  -0.01 -2.50 
** 
 Age  0.000  1.68 
*  -0.001 -2.86 
***  0.001 2.64 
***  0.000 0.13 
 
 Household  head  (dummy)  -0.02  -4.94 
***  0.02 1.43 
  -0.01 -1.74 
*  0.02 1.95 
* 
  Spouse of household head (dummy)  -0.02  -5.59 
***  0.02 2.17 
**  0.00 -0.21 
  0.00 0.10 
 
 Migrant  (dummy)  0.00  -0.28 
  -0.04 -3.68 
***  0.01 1.94 
*  0.02 3.77 
*** 
 Education  dummies
†    
    
    
    
 
  Primary  -0.01  -3.85 
***  -0.02 -3.16 
***  0.02 3.06 
***  0.02 3.12 
*** 
  Lower  secondary  -0.01  -3.67 
***  -0.09 -7.20 
***  0.04 4.06 
***  0.07 6.75 
*** 
                                                 




  Upper  secondary  -0.02  -2.29 
**  -0.22 -8.24 
***  0.05 2.88 
***  0.19 8.06 
*** 
  Post  secondary  0.00  -0.22 
  -0.39 -8.18 
***  0.04 1.53 
  0.36 8.33 
*** 
             
    
Household characteristics    
    
    
    
 
  Female household head (dummy)  0.01  1.70 
*  -0.06 -4.77 
***  0.04 4.03 
***  0.01 0.69 
 
  Age of household head  0.00  -2.76 
***  0.00 2.89 
***  0.00 -2.13 
**  0.00 0.20 
 
  Household Structure    
    
    
    
 
    Household size (no. of members)  0.001  0.84 
  -0.002 -1.68 
*  0.000 -0.31 
  0.002 2.10 
** 
    Share of children < 5
†† 0.00  0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
 
    Share of children 5–14  0.00  0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
 
    Share of women 15–64  0.00  0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00 
 
    Share of members 65+  0.00  0.00 
  0.00 0.01 
  0.00 0.01 
  0.00 -0.02 
 
             
    
Radio (dummy - HH owns one)  0.00  -1.10 
  -0.03 -5.42 
***  0.03 5.43 
***  0.01 2.45 
** 
             
    
  Non-labor income (log)  0.00  0.00 
  0.00 -0.01 
  0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.02 
 
  Value of agricultural assets (log)  0.00  -0.03 
  0.00 0.24 
  0.00 -0.13 
  0.00 -0.19 
 
  Land holding dummies
†††    
    
    
    
 
  None  0.12  6.81 
***  -0.45 -19.15 
***  0.18 9.13 
***  0.15 8.30 
*** 
  1–3  hectares  -0.01  -4.05 
***  0.04 7.13 
***  -0.01 -3.03 
***  -0.01 -3.37 
*** 
  3–5  hectares  -0.01  -3.18 
***  0.05 7.45 
***  -0.02 -2.72 
***  -0.02 -4.64 
*** 
     5–10 hectares  -0.01  -2.49 
**  0.04 3.95 
***  -0.01 -0.93 
  -0.02 -2.51 
** 
  10+  hectares  -0.01  -1.28 
  0.01 0.43 
  0.00 -0.13 
  0.01 0.62 
 
Difficult access to formal credit (dummy)  0.01  3.67 
***  -0.02 -3.23 
***  0.00 0.27 
  0.00 0.90 
 
             
    
Community characteristics    
    
    
    
 
  MFI available in community  0.01  1.34 
  0.01 2.06 
**  -0.01 -1.51 
  -0.01 -3.20 
*** 
  Phone (dummy at least one HH owns)  0.01  0.82 
  -0.10 -5.60 
***  0.06 4.81 
***  0.02 2.96 
*** 
 Electricity  access  (dummy)  -0.01  -2.41 
**  -0.01 -0.72 
  -0.02 -2.70 
***  0.03 4.14 
*** 
 Piped  water  access  (dummy) 0.00  1.00 
  -0.03 -4.52 
***  0.02 3.26 
***  0.01 2.17 
** 
  Distance to nearest city (dummies)
††††    
    
    
    
 
    < 2 hours  0.01  1.17 
  -0.05 -3.24 
***  0.04 2.83 
***  0.01 0.63 
 
  2–5  hours  0.00  0.54 
  0.00 -0.31 
  -0.01 -0.91 
  0.01 0.98 
 
  10–15  hours  -0.01  -1.62 
  -0.02 -1.55 
  0.02 1.77 
*  0.01 1.22 
 
  15–24  hours  0.01  1.78 
*  -0.02 -1.78 
*  0.00 -0.42 
  0.01 1.32 
 
  24+  hours  0.00  -0.81 
  0.00 0.36 
  0.00 -0.35 
  0.00 0.55 
 
                          
Percent  in  each  category  4     85     5     6    
Number of observations                    13,339     
Pseudo R-squared                             0.30       
Source: Data from EPM 2005                         
Note: Region dummies included but not shown. Left out category is ‘agricultural non-wage’. 
Note: Marginal effects show the average change in the probability of ‘sector’ of employment resulting from a unit change in the independent variable. 
Consequently the marginal effects sum to zero across the categories. 
† Left out category is no education; 
†† Left out category is men 15–64;
 ††† Left out category is < 1 hectare; †††† Left out category is 5–10 hours 
 
As with the household livelihood choice models, education is associated with higher 
probabilities of non-farm employment. Individuals with a lower (upper) secondary education 
are 7% (19%) more likely to work in non-farm wage activities than those with no education. 
Such individuals are particularly less likely to work on the family farm for their primary 
employment. In the context of household livelihood strategies, this suggests that in 




on the farm, while those with more education perform higher-paying non-farm wage 
activities. Interestingly, members with higher levels of education are also more likely to help 
out on the family farm for their second jobs – perhaps contributing their labor during peak 
agricultural demand periods (e.g. field preparation, planting, transplanting and harvest). 
Although statistically significant, the relationship between credit and individual employment 
is small. Those living in households without access to credit are 1% more likely to be 
involved in agricultural wage employment and 2% less likely to work on the family farm 
(non-farm non-wage). These small individual effects nonetheless do add up for the 
household unit as a whole, given that this is a household-level constraint. The finding that 
individuals in credit constrained households are those who are more likely to resort to 
agricultural wage labor (associated with low-return household livelihood strategies) is 
consistent with the household choice models in Section 4 and with previous research on the 
importance of credit to household livelihood choice and welfare (Dercon & Krishnan, 1996; 
Ellis, 1998; Brown et al., 2006). 
Access to communication devices (radio and phone) has relationships with individual 
employment similar to those it has with household livelihood strategies. Those with such 
access are more likely to engage in higher-return non-farm activities and are less likely to 
work on the family farm as their primary form of employment. 
The individual choice models shed additional light on the relationship between rural 
electrification and employment opportunities. Electricity access in the community is 
associated with more non-farm wage employment, but not with non-farm non-wage 
activities. This is consistent with the household livelihood models in which a positive 
relationship was found between electricity access and NF strategies where the bulk of non-
farm jobs undertaken by these households are wage activities (73%). It is also consistent 
with the negative relationship found between electricity access and FFNF strategies, given 
that the non-farm activities for these households are predominantly non-wage (72%).  
For the 90% of the rural population living in villages without electricity, high-return non-
farm employment opportunities are more limited. Of those with higher paying non-farm 
wage jobs, 36% live in communities with electricity access, compared to less than 10% of 
those with lower-return non-farm wage employment. Nonetheless, because electrification in 
communities is most certainly not randomly placed, it is difficult to establish the causal 
relationship. For example, while access to electricity may create more non-farm employment 
opportunities, dynamic communities with more non-farm employment may be better 
positioned to establish electricity connections in the first place. 
Interestingly, although we find no clear pattern with regard to remoteness (travel time to 
city) and first jobs, there appears to be a more systematic relationship with second jobs. In 
the most remote areas, secondary employment tends to be concentrated in non-farm non-
wage activities that involve providing services in the local market. These non-farm activities 
may fill a gap created by the high transaction costs associated with remoteness and the 
consequent restricted access to major markets. Further, this pattern of diversification may 
also be driven by the seasonal nature of agricultural calendar as individuals seek out 
employment opportunities during the periods of slack demand for agricultural labor (Ellis, 
1998). 
Because households in the less remote areas (two to five hours) are more likely to specialize 




on the family farm) than those who live five to ten hours away from major cities. This may 
follow from higher returns to agriculture in less remote areas (Stifel & Minten, 2008), 
inducing households to concentrate their household labor in family farming. 
Except for those individuals who live in households with large land holdings (ten hectares or 
more), there is a positive association between land holdings and family farming. For 
example, those with between one and ten hectares of land are 4 to 5% more likely to work on 
the family farm than are small holders (with under one hectare), while those who are landless 
are 45% less likely to do so. With landless individuals 18% and 15% more likely to work 
off-farm in non-wage and wage activities, respectively, non-farm employment for these 
individuals appears to be a result of ‘push’ factors. However, landless individuals are 25% 
more likely than small holders to only have one job. This suggests that the relative returns to 
employment for the landless (e.g. non-farm activities) are higher than for small holders who 
are most likely to be family farmers. These individuals may in fact be landless because they 
are unable to find high-return employment. 
Turning to other individual correlates, we find that women are significantly more likely to be 
employed as non-wage workers in the non-farm sector (3% more than for men), but are less 
likely to undertake non-farm wage work.
25 As individuals get older, they are less likely to 
work on the family farm and more likely to undertake non-wage employment off the farm. 
While household heads and their spouses are less likely to work as agricultural wage 
laborers, household heads are more likely to find non-farm wage work, while their spouses 
are more likely to remain on the family farm. Those who migrated to their current location 
within the past five years are more likely to be involved in non-farm activities and less likely 
to work on a family farm. 
Rural labor earnings 
We now turn to econometric estimates of earnings and, by extension, the correlates of 
employment quality once an individual has ‘chosen’ a sector. In particular, earnings 
functions are estimated separately for those who are employed in (a) agricultural wage, (b) 
family farming, (c) non-farm non-wage or (d) non-farm wage activities (Table 10). The 
dependent variable in each of these models is the log of real daily earnings.
26 The 
explanatory variables are typical of those found in standard Mincerian earnings functions and 
include experience,
27 levels of education, hours worked, a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one if the individual is female, and controls for location (not shown). We also 
control for selection bias by using a correction method proposed by Bourguignon et al. 
(2002). This is an extension of Lee’s (1983) method in which the selectivity is modeled as a 
multinomial logit, rather than as a probit (Heckman, 1979). The multinomial logit selection 
models are based on those that appear in the previous section.  
                                                 
25 Lanjouw (2001) had a similar finding based on probit models for El Salvador where women were more likely 
than men to be employed in low-productivity non-farm activities. He did not find a significant difference, 
however, for high productivity jobs. 
26 Since we use the log of earnings, the estimated coefficients represent a percentage change in earnings for a 
one unit change in the independent variable. 
27 Experience is difficult to measure because we do not know when individuals began working. Here we use the 
difference between individual’s age and the number of years of schooling plus five years. It is important to 
account for experience because experience and educational attainment are negatively correlated. Since 
experience is likely to contribute positively to earnings (up to a point), the error terms in the estimated models 
are likely to be negatively correlated with educational attainment if experience is not included as an explanatory 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We find positive and significant estimates of schooling that are substantial, but that are 
varied across employment types. We caution that these returns are likely to be overestimated 
because the correlation between education and earnings does not necessarily represent 
causation. For example, because adolescents living in households with more education are 
more likely to attend school (Stifel et al., 2007), schooling is not randomly distributed among 
the individuals in the sample, and the parameter estimates are probably biased.
28 Thus we 
proceed with caution. 
Returns to schooling are largest among those in the non-farm sector in general and among 
the wage employed in particular. They are significant for secondary education in family 
farming, though not for primary education. For agricultural wage workers, the positive 
returns to education are only significant for those with primary education. This is probably 
because the sample of agricultural wage workers is small and very few have secondary 
education or higher. As expected, returns to schooling for non-farm employment are 
considerably larger than in farming. For example, while the returns to lower secondary 
education are 71% (higher earnings than those without schooling), the returns are 48% and 
10% for non-farm non-wage and family farming, respectively.
29 
In short, education is an important factor associated not only with non-farm employment 
opportunities for the rural population in Madagascar but also with higher earnings for those 
employed in the non-farm sector. It appears that those individuals and households with little 
or no education face barriers not only to acquiring non-farm jobs, but also to reaping the full 
benefits of the potentially high-return non-farm sector. 
Controlling for education, experience and other factors associated with employment 
selection, we find that women’s non-agricultural wage and non-wage earnings are 42% and 
20% lower than those of men, respectively. Although we do not find a significant difference 
between the earnings of men and women in agriculture, this does not imply that the earnings 
are necessarily equal, since our measure of agricultural earnings is based on equal sharing of 
total household agricultural earnings.
30 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we examine the relationship between rural non-farm employment and 
household welfare using nationally representative data from Madagascar. In doing so, we 
focus our attention on labor outcomes in the context of household livelihood strategies that 
                                                 
28 As Behrman (1999) notes, ‘individuals with higher investments in schooling are likely to be individuals with 
more ability and more motivation who come from family and community backgrounds that provide more 
reinforcement for such investments and who have lower marginal private costs for such investments and lower 
discount rates for the returns to those investments and who are likely to have access to higher quality schools’. 
29 The level of education used in the non-wage models is the highest level of education attained by a household 
member working in the family farm/non-farm enterprise. The rationale for this measure is that non-wage 
earnings are measured by total farm/enterprise earnings and then are distributed equally among those working 
on the farm/enterprise. Given intra-household (in this case intra-farm or intra-enterprise) education 
externalities, the most appropriate measure of education is that of the member with the highest level of 
education. 
30 There are two sources of error implicit in this measure of agricultural labor earnings. The first assumption is 
that all household agricultural labor is equally productive, and the second is that resources are shared equally 




include farm and non-farm income earning opportunities. We identify distinct household 
livelihood strategies that can be ordered in welfare terms, and estimate multinomial logit 
models to assess the extent to which there are barriers to choosing dominant strategies. 
Individual employment choice models, as well as estimates of earnings functions, provide 
supporting evidence of these barriers. 
We find that the non-farm sector may indeed provide an important pathway out of poverty. 
As is commonly found in other African countries (Barrett et al., 2001), there is a positive 
relationship between rural non-farm employment and welfare as measured by per capita 
household expenditure. The percentage of workers with non-farm employment rises by 
expenditure quintile, with 11% in this sector employed in the poorest quintile and 31% in the 
richest.  
It is perhaps best, however, to understand rural non-farm employment in the context of 
household livelihood strategies. After all, ‘diversification is the norm’ (Barrett et al., 2001), 
especially among agricultural households whose livelihoods are vulnerable to climatic 
uncertainties. In principle, diversification could be accomplished through land and financial 
asset diversification. But the absence of well-functioning land and capital markets often 
means that these diversification strategies are not feasible. Consequently, many rural 
households find themselves pursuing second-best diversification strategies through the 
allocation of household labor (Bhaumik et al., 2006). Household labor supply and allocation 
decisions among farm and non-farm activities are thus made by weighing both productivity 
and risk factors. 
The four distinct household livelihood strategies identified for rural Madagascar, ordered 
from inferior to superior, are (a) any agricultural wage (AW), (b) family farming only (FF), 
(c) family farm and non-farm activities (FFNF) and (d) non-farm activities only (NF). 
Multinomial logit model estimates of household strategy choice indicate that there may be 
barriers to participation in high-return non-farm activities (FFNF and NF). First, households 
with higher levels of educational attainment tend to be those that choose the dominant 
strategies. It appears that poor households with low levels of education generally face greater 
barriers than the non-poor in their choices of high-return livelihood strategies. Second, 
households without access to formal credit tend to adopt inferior strategies and are less likely 
to combine family farming with non-farm activities. Third, households with access to 
telecommunication – and by extension information on price and market conditions outside of 
the community – are more likely to choose the dominant livelihood strategies. Households 
living in communities without such access are more likely to allocate labor to farming 
activities that are geared to home consumption and the local market – i.e. those activities that 
are likely to have lower remunerative rewards. 
Nonetheless, although these potential barriers may mean that high-return strategies are 
limited to a subpopulation of well-endowed households, the non-farm sector can still benefit 
the poor. On the one hand, for those with limited asset endowments entry barriers limit 
access to high-return non-farm activities (e.g. the wage sector). On the other hand, low-
return non-farm activities tend to provide opportunities for ex ante risk reduction, as well as 
for ex post coping with shocks. The non-farm non-wage sector tends to play this safety net 
role in Madagascar. In addition, non-farm activities may also have an indirect effect on 
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